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This paper analyzes the impact of monetary policy, finance and credit programs on Micro,
Cottage, Small and Medium Enterprises (MCSME) development in the Philippines. It also examines
corresponding monetary policies, finance and credit programs in Japan, Korea and Taiwan and attempts
to draw for the Philippines some lessons and implications from their experience. Theultimate objective
is to recommend specific policies and legislative actions for the promotion of MCSMEs in the country.
The Philippine monetary and banking policies have gone through several changes. Between the
creation of the Central Bank (1949) and 1985, cheap credit policies had been maintained. Highly
specialized banks were created to serve specific sectors of the economy. The result was that the financial
system was not able generate enough resources and create instruments to meet the rapidly growing
demands of the real sector. Although MCSMEs were specifically targeted by these policies, still they
were left out by the formal credit system. The more repressed the financial system, the more they were
left out. In other words, the subsidy in credit went to those who did not need the subsidy. The myriad
of special credit programs hardly helped the MCSME.
The reforms in 1985 were significant in the sense that instruments for repressing the financial
system were gradually removed. For instance, most subsidized credit programs were either closed or
rationalized. The reason is because small borrowers_ like the MCSMEs, are willing to pay the market
rate of interest provided they are given access to credit. In addition, restrictions on bank entry and
branching are gradually being removed.
Interestingly, however, the government has not only maintained but increased the number of
special credit programs. Most of them charge the market rate of interest and utilize NGOs as conduits
of the funds. This raises some questions. First, the viabilityof these programs could not be immediately
ascertained because subsidies are hidden. For instance, the salaries of the staff managing the programs
are not reflected in any appraisal of the program. Second, these programs are small, fragmented, and
overlapping in function with each other. Understandably, efforts to assist MCSME are also fragmented.
Thus, MCSMEs are left without any support from the government.
Threats of policy reversal have become more pronounced given the number of bills filed in
Congress that recommend the re-institution of subsidized credit policy and ceilings on lending rates.
There are several lessons that can be drawn from the experience of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan
in assisting the development of their MCSMEs. First is appropriate macroeconomic policies. Small
banks were allowed to proliferate in the Japanese landscape. The historically low inflation rate of
Japan was conducive to savings mobilization. This explains why lending to SMEs from special credit
programs comprised only a small proportion of total credit obtained by SMEs. Second, Japan has a
legal framework for the promotion of SMEs. An example is the law that protects subcontractors from
unfair practices of the mother companies. This has contributed to the growth of subcontracting business
in Japan. Third, Japan provides ample technological and marketing support to their SMEs to make
them competitive even in the world market. And finally, Japan created a lead agency to assist the
SMEs. Being a corporation, it has greater flexibility in meeting the changing demands of the SMEs.
Korea basically followed the footsteps of Japan, i.e.,its government is heavily involved in the
promotion of SMEs. The assistance is focused on knowledge-intensive SMEs by providing technology
and venture capital. However, it is encountering some difficulties because in the past, its industrial
policies favored the establishment of large industries. Subcontracting in Korea is not as well developed
as that of Japan.
Taiwan sharply differs from the approach pursued by Japan and Korea. In fact, it is only
recently that this country started some programs to assist SMEs. But Taiwan's overall economic policies
had been conducive to the development of $MEs. For instance, Taiwan's rural infrastructure system
is far superior to that of Korea. Thus, SMEs in the rural sector were able to operate viably.
No matter how monetary policy is made conducive to the development of MCSMEs, it cannot
work independently of the rest of macroeconomic policies. The first task therefore is to fmetune
macroeconomic policies so that their biases against MCSME willbe reduced, if not totally eliminated.
As regards monetary policy, a fighter control on the movements of monetary aggregates is desirable to
achieve a stable movement of the general price level.
There is a need to create a body which will promote the cause of the MCSME. Its task will
be to concretize policies and not to formulate them. A corporation similar to Japan Small Business
Corporation is suggested. It may set up its own research and training institutes or incorporate in it
existing research and training institutes. It will be funded by integrating the existing lending programs
for MCSMEs including the six major lending programs of Technology and Livelihood Resource Center
(TLRC).
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MCSME PROMOTION POLICY AND
LEGISLATIVE AGENDA: FOCUS ON MONETARY POLICY,
FINANCE AND CREDIT PROGRAMS*
Marie B. Lamberte*"
I. INTRODUCTION
The importance of micro, cottage, small and medium ente_riscs (MCSMEs) in
developing as well as developed economies has been well recognizcd.'In terms of number,
MCSMEs dominate the economic landscape. Their contribution to employment and output
is by no means small. They simultaneously fulfill several desirable objectives of any society
such as employment, equity, and geographical dispersion of industries. They also figure out
prominently in the export drive of several countries. They tend to produce products that
greatly depend on locally-available factor inputs. It is therefore understandable that most
developing economies try hard to develop and promote MCSMEs. Interestingly, the
concern towards MCSME development is not often reflected in development policies of
several countries including the Philippines. MCSME promotional programs have therefore
been rendered less effective, if not totally ineffective at all. It might also be argued that
appropriate policies may not automatically produce art environment conducive for MCSME
development. In LDCs, MCSMEs face several bottlenecks, and MCSME promotional
*Paper presented at the "Moore Policy Workshop on Small Enterprise Development in the Philippines," 27 July 1990 at the
Univerelty of the Philippines Institute of Small*SQale Industries, jointly sponsored by the Appropriate Technology International (ATI)
and Congressional Economic Planning Staff (CEPS) with the support of the International Development Resea_h Center 0DRC).
Vice-President, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
lper resolution of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) dated 12February 1986,enterprises ere classified
according to the following asset sizes: 1) micro enterprises - leas than P50,000;2) cottage en_rpri_'.s - P50,000to P500,000;3) small-
scale enterprises - PS00,000to P5 million; and 4) medium-_ale enterprises - P5 million to P'20 million.
2programs such as entrepreneurial and skills training programs, and technology and
marketing information systems can heli_ MCSMEs overcome these bottlenecks.
Recently, there has been a resurgence of interest in promoting SMEs in highly
developed economies like Japan and the USA and newly industrializing economies like
Korea and Taiwan. In this age of high technology, MCSMEs have been relied upon to push
the frontiers of development. The policy environment has been altered to allow MCSMEs
to develop, apply, and commercialize new technology and products. In these high-risk
ventures in which success or failure can only be felt after five to seven years, new ways of
financing have been developed by the financial markets. In LDCs where financial markets
are less developed, the MCSMEs' role in developing, applying, and commercializing new
products and technology is severely limited. Thus, unless those factors that constrain the
development of their financial markets are adequately dealt with, LDCs will be further left
behind in this age of high technology.
This paper attempts to undertake a detailed analysis of the impact of monetary
policy, finance and credit programs on MCSME development in the Philippines. It also
examines corresponding monetary policies, finance and credit programs in Japan, Korea and
Taiwan and tries to draw for the Philippines some lessons and implications from their
experience. The ultimate objective of the paper is to recommend specific policies and
legislative actions for the promotion of MCSMEs in the country.
Chapter II makes a detailed assessment of current monetary policy, finance and
credit programs for SMEs. It includes a brief situationer on SMEs in the Philippines and
a discussion of the methods of financing their business. Chapter III reviews corresponding
monetary policy, finance and credit programs in Japan, Korea and Taiwan and discusses
some lessons and implications from their experience for the Philippines. Chapter IV
provides a critical assessment of the pending bills in Congress that have some bearing on
SME development in the country. The last chapter presents some recommendations for
government legislative action and private sector adoption.
II. ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT MON-E-i-ARY AND CREDIT POLICn:;-_
This chapter assesses the current monetary and credit policies with special reference
to MCSME financing. It is divided into four sections. The first presents a simple
framework that describes the role of major participants in the financial markets and the
process of intermediation. The second section discusses the present structure of the
Philippine financial system, while the third assesses the current monetary and credit policies
within the context of the framework developed in the first section. The fourth section
describes the important features of special credit programs for MCSMEs in the country.
"Finally, the last section of this chapter provides a brief situationer on small and medium
enterprises in the country and discusses the methods of financing their business.
A. Theoretical Framework
There are seven major players in the financial markets, namely, the deficit units,
the surplus units, financial intermediaries, the Central Bank, the government (fiscal sector),
foreign private financial institutions and external donors. The network of relationships
3among the agents in the financial markets is described in Figure 1. Producing units may
either be self-financing or net borrowers in the financial markets. Net borrowers or deficit
units have alternative sources of funds. They may borrow from surplus units directly or
indirectly through financial intermediaries. Note that financial intermediaries also borrow
funds from surplus units that are, in turn, lent to deficit units. Financial intermediaries are
supposed to mobilize and allocate resources in a more efficient manner. If financial
intermediation is inefficient, then both surplus and deficit units will be better off if they
directly make the financial transactions.
The government, foreign donors, and foreign private financial institutions are
alternative sources of funds for deficit units. The funds provided by these institutions to
deficit units may be coursed either through the financial intermediaries, the Central Bank,
or through non-financial conduits such as non-government organizations 0NGOs) that have
lending programs.
The Central Bank is an important agent in the financial market because of its dual
role. It regulates the financial system to protect the interest of surplus units, financial
intermediaries, and deficit units, and at the same time, stabilizes the economy through its
power to create and destroy money. Its regulatory functions include, among others, the
granting to or withdrawal from entities of a banking license and examination of the book
of accounts of financial intermediaries. Its stabilization function may be accomplished by
injecting into or withdrawing money from the financial system through the financial
intermediaries and/or the government. This is made possible through the use of its
monetary instruments such as reserve requirement on deposit liabilities, rediscounting
facility, and open market operations.
It is important at this point to describe the process of intermediation and examine
the impact of alternative policies on the price and volume of loans and deposits. Figure
2 presents a simple framework of the intermediation process. Deficit units express their
demand for external funds given alternative lending rates. To meet the credit demand of
deficit units, financial intermediaries mobilize deposits by offering surplus units with
attractive deposit rates. Under an ideal situation where intermediation cost and profit are
zero, and where there are no distortions in the financial market, demand for loanable
funds will be satisfied at the equilibrium interest , where deposit and lending rates are
equal. Projects that yield rates of return greater than or equal to, will be funded by the
system. Now consider a ceiling on lending rate, ,.',which is below the market rate, ,." Since
this implies lowering the deposit rate as well, fewer funds will be mobilized by the financial
intermediaries as depositors, especially the large ones, shift their fundsto high-yielding
foreign or physical assets, resulting in the reduction in the supply Offunds. Excess demand
occurs, and some of those that were previously serviced by the financial intermediaries
could not obtain loans anymore. Under this situation, rationing is likely to take place, and
financial intermediaries might exploit this situation by charging higher effective rates on
loans through various means such as requiring deposit hold-out, increasing service charges,
etc. Some will be completely rationed out while those who are not being rationed out will
be paying a rate, say ,*, which is more than the rate under a liberal interest rate regime.
One may think of a situation in which interest ra_ ceiling is binding; that is, there
is a regulation which authorities can effectively enforce ag_iinst imposing additional charges
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on loans that can make the effective lending rate higher than the prescribed rate. Figure
3 shows that it will have a different effect on large and small borrowers, ol and ucl
respectively, are the demand and marginal cost curves of small borrowers while o2 and
uc2, respectively, represent the demand and marginal cost curves of large borrowers. NoW
that ucl is steeper than uc_, reflecting the higher cost of lending to small borrowers than
large borrowers. At the interest rate ceiling _, large borrowers obtain loans, _*, while
small borrowers get u*. If the interest rate ceiling were further reduced to r**,large
borrowers will obtain a larger amount of loans, u2, while small borrowers will secure only
ul, which is smaller than if the interest rate ceiling were set at r*. This suggeStS that as
the interest rate ceiling becomes more restrictive, more loans will be concentrated in the
hands of large borrowers at the expense of small borrowers. This is the "iron law of interest
rate restriction" hypothesized by Gonzales-Vega (1984).
So far, the possible effects of imposing interest rate ceilings on the supply and
price of loanable funds have been discussed. There are Central Bank/government actions
that could drive a wedge between the deposit and loan rates, the ultimate effect of which
is to drive the deposit rate downwards and the lending rate upwards. Consider, for
example, the case of imposing a uniform reserve requirement on all deposit liabilities of
banks. Let
L = a-k)o (1)
where L = supply of loanable funds;
o - volume of deposits; and
k - reserve requirement ratio.
It is immediately clear from the above that the supply of loanable funds is now less than
the volume of deposits, i.e,, L <o. Assuming zero transactions cost and that banks were
to attain at least zero profit, then
rK=_D
or , = ,/a-kj (2)
where, = the nominallendingrate; and
i -the nominal deposit rate.
Equation (2) suggests that the lending rate increases with the reserve requirement ratio.
This is shown in Table 1 where different values for I,are assumed.
The above analysis may be modified by adding a requirement that all banks allocate
a certain proportion, ,, of their loanable funds for lending to a priority sector. Assume, for
the sake of simplicity, that the interest rate on the loans to this priority sector is set at
zero, which is below the market rate. Equation 2 may be modified as follows:
,z'ffi_ (3)
wherei:,=#-_)L= thefreeIoanablefundsforthelessfavoredsectoroftheeconomy
that pays the market rate;
7
8Table 1
NOMINAL LENDING RATES GIVEN DIFFERENT RESERVE
REQUIREMENT RATIOS AND ZERO PROFIT
(In Percent)
k i r
5 5 5.26
i0 5 5.56
15 5 5.88
20 5 6.25
25 5 6.67
30 5 7.14
Notes: k = reserve requirement ratio
i = nominal deposit rate
r = nominal lending rate
,.= the nominal market rate that would be charged to less favored sector (f
the economy;
°ffi the mandated proportion of total loanable funds allocated to the
priority sector;
_= total loanable funds allocated to
the priority sector;and
i_,z as defined before.
Then, r'(1-a)£ = iD
or r'= va-_Ja-v (4)
This suggests that the lending rate, r', increases with the loan portfolio requirement, ,, for
the same reserve requirement, k. This is illustrated in Table 2 where different values for
, are assumed while fining the value for k. Note that r., the lending rate on loans to the
less favored sector when the reserve requirement and loan portfolio requirement ratios
are simultaneously imposed, is greater than r, the lending rate when only the reserve
requirement is imposed. Thus, under the policy described above, banks tend to increase
the rate they charge to the less favored sector of the economy to compensate for the
income loss they suffer due to the requirement to lend to the priority sector at a rate less
than the market rate.
Some complications to the basic model may further be introduced by considering
the impact of inflation on intermediation cost and lending rate. Let
r'= t-,j, = the real lending rate, and
_-= i- ,p = the real deposit rate,
where r = the nominal lending rate,
= the nominal deposit rate, and
,t, = the expected inflation rate.
Subtracting el, from both sides of equation (2) and substituting i-+ et, for _,we obtain
:= i-/a-k)+ ep0va_) (5)
Equation (5) states that the higher the real deposit rate a'), the reserve requirement ratio
00, and the expected inflation rate (et0,the higher is the real loan rate that the bank would
charge even if it does not realize a profit. The loci of real lending rates shown in Figure
4 for different inflation rates are derived from Table 3. It shows, for example, that if the
reserve requirement and expected inflation rate were 20 percent and 10 percent,
reslx_tively, then for a zero real deposit rate, the bank's lending rate should be 2.5 percent
to obtain at least a zero profit. But if the expected inflation rate were 20 percent, then for
the same reserve requirement ratio and real deposit rate, the bank's lending rate would be
raised to 5 percent to attain a zero profit. This means that a higher inflation rate would
lead to a higher bank spread, which in turn would raise the lending rate even if banks were
to realize a zero profit. Thus, inflationary monetary policy would hurt borrowers, especially
the MCSMEs. Bringing the inflation rate down from an initially high level will not
I0
Table 2
NOMINAL LENDING RATES ASSUMING DIFFERENT LOAN
PORTFOLIO REQUIREMENT RATIOS AND
ZERO PROFIT
(In Percent)
k i a r
10 5 5 5.85
10 5 10 6.17
i0 5 15 6.53
i0 5 20 6.94
i0 5 25 7.41
i0 5 30 7.94
Notes: k = reserve requirement ratio
i = nominal deposit rate
r = nominal lending rate
a = loan portfolio requirement ratio
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Tabte 3
LENDINGRATESWITH A 20 PERCENTRESERVEREQUIREMENTRATIO
ONDEPOSITSANDVARIOUSEXPECTEDINFLATIONRATES
(In Percent)
ep = 0 ep = 10 ep = 20
i 'i r r" i _ii r r 'I _ _il r r u
0 0 0.00 0.00 0 -10 0 -10.00 0 -20 0 -20.00
5 5 6.25 6.25 5 -5 6,25 -3.75 5 -15 6.25 -13.75
10 10 12.50 12.50 10 0 12.50 2.50 10 -I0 12.50 -7.50
15 15 18.75 18.75 15 5 18.75 8.75 15 -5 18.75 -1.25
20 20 25.00 25.00 20 10 25.00 15.00 20 0 25.00 5.00
25 25 31.25 31.25 25 15 35.00 21.25 25 5 31.75 11.25
30 20 37.50 27.50 30 10 37.50 17.50
35 15 43.75 23.75
40 20 50.00 30.00
Notes: i = nominal deposit rate
i" = rear deposit rate
r = nominal [ending rate
r" = rear [ending rate
ep = expected inftation rate
13
automatically reduce the intermediation cost. This depends on the monetary instrument
being used by the monetary authorities. If reserve requirement were increased to siphon
off excess liquidity to reduce inflationary pressures, then the intermediation cost would not
decline as clearly shown in equation (5).
B. Present Structure of the Financial System
The financial system of the Philippines has grown in size and complexity since the
Philippines gained her independence in 1946. However, it has remained underdeveloped
compared to those of the fast growing economies of her Asian neighbors.
The financial system has two large sub-markets, namely the formal and the informal
markets (Figure 5). Several studies have shown the importance of the informal financial
markets in efficiently mobilizing and allocating resources. The informal financial markets
have remained large and active especially in the last few years when the entire financial
system encountered some difficulties because of a series of bank failures and the economic
crisis in the mid-1980s (Lamberte 1988, and Lamberte and Lira 1987). They have been the
main sources of funds for the small farmers and MCSMEs (Agabin ,,.,_. 1989). This topic
will be discussed again later.
The formal financial markets, meanwhile, are supervised mainly by the Central
Bank. Thus, the discussion in this section will focus on the structure of the formal financial
system under the supervision of the Central Bank.
The total real assets of the formal financial system had been growing fairly well in
the early 1980s until an economy-wide crisis struck in 1984 and 1985 (Figure 6). It plunged
precipitously in 1983 as a result of high inflation rates and capital flight that got out of
hand between 1983 and 1985. It started to recover in 1987 but as of 1988, total real assets
of the financial system were still far below the 1983 level.
The formal financial system has two major sub-systems, namely, the banking system
and the non-bank financial system. The main difference between the two is that institutions
belonging to the former are licensed to accept traditional deposits (i.e., demand, savings,
and time deposits) while those belonging to the latter are prohibited from accepting
deposits. As of December 1988, both systems have about the same number of outlets
(Table 4). On the average, there were 4 outletsper municipality/city in the country (Table
5), However, there was a great concentration of outlets in Metro Manila, which is
considered as the financial capital of the country. MCSMEs, majority of which are located
in rural areas, are definitely placed in a-.seriously disadvantageous position compared to
large industries located in M_tro Manila, given the existing distribution of financial outlets
in the country. In terms- of assets, the banking system clearly dominated the financial
landscape, contributing 89 percent of the total assets of the financial system in 1988. Within
the banking system, the commercial banking system appears to be the biggest sub-system.
its assets comprised 74 percent of the total assets of the financial system in 1988. Being
national banks, commercial banks have the most extensive branching network in the
country. However, their branches are located mostly in more affluent cities and towns in
the regions. Banking services in smaller cities and towns have been dominated by the rural
banking system, and in certain areas, by thrift banks.
14
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Table 4
NUMBEROF INSTITUTIONSANDFINANCIALASSETS
OF THEFINANCIALSYSTEM,DECEMBER1988
Number of
Institutions Total Assets
Institutions
Head ALL In miLtion
offices Outlets Pesos gistrib'n.
(In Percent)
TOTAL 3,697 6,805 404,895 100.00
A. Banks 982 3,562 360,377 89.00
Commercial Banks 29 1o746 299,618 74.00
Thrift Banks 110 664 24,877 6.20
POBs 41 25 66,660 1.70
BHBS 8 250 14,192 3.50
SSLAs 61 209 4,'025 1.00
Rurat Banks 840 1,048 10,693 2.60
Speciatized
Government Banks 3 104 25,189 6.20
Non-Bank Financial 2,631 3,158 41,898 10.30
institutions ................................
Investment Houses 15 31 8,456 2.10
Financing Cos. 143 237 7,364 1.80
Securities Dea(ers/
Brokers 132 132 1,706 0.40
Investment Cos. 75 75 5,615 1.40
Fund managers 12 12 1,777 0.40
Lending Investors 659 697 636 0.20
Pawnshops 1,574 1,953 1,666 0.40
Honey Brokers
GovernmentNon-Bank
Financia[
institutions 3 3 14,578 3.60
Venture Capita[ 13 13 100
Non-Bank Thrift
Institutions 84 85 2,620 0.70
Source= CB Fact Book: PhiLippine Financiat System, 1988.
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The deposit markets appear to be more competitive compared to the loans market.
Commercial banks are the biggest mobilizers of private deposits even in the countryside.
However, the data shown in Table 6 suggest that most of their mobilized funds are
transferred to highly commercialized and industrialized regions, specifically Metro Manila,
where there is excess demand for funds by low-risk borrowers such as the prime large
domestic and multinational companies.
The financial system suffered three major crises during the past 20 years. From
1970 to 1987, the Central Bank already closed a total of 221 banks, more than half of which
were rural banks. Thrift banks also suffered a number of closures (Table 7).
One feature of the Philippine financial system is the presence of a large
government-owned commercial bank (i.e., the Philippine National Bank or PNB) and two
specialized government banks (i.e., the Development Bank of the Philippines or DBP and
the Land Bank of the Philippines or LBP).2 Providing financial services to MCSMEs is one
of the mandates explicitly incorporated in their charters. PNB has remained the biggest in
terms of total assets even when its assets were already reduced by half in 1986 because of
the transfer of its non-performing assets to the National Government. The government
already started the process of privatizing PNB by successfully selling 30 percent of its total
outstanding shares in June 1989.
The DBP was created by the government primarily to provide long-term funds to
agriculture and industry. It was also given the task of promoting the establishment of
private development banks through direct equity participation.
DBP's role was purely developmental. Unlike PNB, it did not compete with private
commercial banks in mobilizing deposits. Instead, it mainly relied on subsidies from the
government, deposits of government corporations, notably the Government Social Insurance
System and the Social Security System, and foreign loans, which were earmarked for special
projects. On the lending side, it concentrated in financing long-gestating projects such as
steel, cement, shipping, mining, etc., that were deemed crucial to the economic development
of the country but required huge financial outlays. It also provided guarantees to several
foreign loans contracted by private corporations. In the early 1980s, it was heavily involved
in rehabilitating private financial institutions by either infusing fresh capital or lending to
ailing ones.
DBP used to be the second largest financial institution in the country next to PNB.
Between 1980 and 1985, its total assets more than doubled from P27 billion to P72 billion.
In 1986,DBP underwent a rehabilitation program that involved the transfer to the National
Government of its non-performing assets totalling P61.4 billion and certain liabilities and
related accounts amounting to P62.2 biUion. This drastically reduced DBP's total assets
to 1'9.5 billion in 1986. As of the moment, DBP has already resumed its normal lending
operations. Government subsidies to DBP are being gradually phased out. But it remains
2
-The other _3¢¢ializ_d govenuncnbowaod bank, i.e., the Philippine Amanah Bank, is now moribund. I.BP has recently been
reclassifted as a commercial bank.
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Table 6
LOAN-TO-DEPOSIT RATIO OF COMMERCIAL BANKS
Region 1985 1984 1983
NCR 1.07 1.28 1.44
I 0.21 0.24 0.29
II 0.42 0.52 0.75
III 0.29 0.34 0.48
IV 0.30 0.32 0.44
V 0.44 0.43 0.64
VI 1.24 1.20 1.63
VII 0.43 0.55 0.81
VIII 0.42 0.45 0.68
IX 0.30 0.50 0.66
X 0.45 0.46 1.07
XI 0.43 0.47 0.70
XII 0.37 0.42 0.55
Source: Central Bank, Fact Book: Philippine Financial System
(1983-1985)
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Table 7
NUMBER OF CLOSED PDIC BANKS
Bank Group 1970-1987
Comt_ercial Banks 6
Savings and
Mortgage Banks 5
Private Development
Banks 4
Stock Savings and
Loan Associations 26
Rural Banks 180
Specialised Government
Banks
All Banks 221
Percent to Total Member Banks
Source: PDIC Annual Reports (various years).
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as the major conduit of externally funjded special credit programs such as the IndustrialGuarantee Loan Fund.
LBP was created primarily to assist land reform beneficiaries of their financial
needs and to finance the acquisition by the government of landed estates for division and
resale to small landholders. But it functioned mainly as a commercial bank using deposits
of the National Government and government-owned corporations as its main resources.
Its loans to land reform beneficiaries comprised only less than 10 percent of its total loan
portfolio. Its total assets as of December 1987 stood at P12.6 billion. Unlike PNB and
DBP, it did not encounter any major financial difficulties. Recently, the role of LBP has
been expanded to meet the demands of small farmers who are going to be the beneficiaries
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). It has now concentrated on
wholesale lending to financial and non-financial intermediaries operating in the rural areas.
There are 12 types of non-bank financial institutions in the country. We will
highlight here the performance of two of them, namely leasing companies and venture
capital corporations, because of the role they play in providing funds to MCSMEs. In the
Philippines, leasing companies are classified under financing companies. In fact, financing
companies may engage in leasing upon securing authority from the Securities and Exchange
Commission and registering with the Central Bank. Only 38 of the 237 existing financing
companies have been engaged in leasing. Most of them, especially the larger ones, are
subsidiaries of banks. Their clients consist of households and small and medium
enterprises. The regulation pertaining to the single borrower's limit force them to lend only
to SMEs. For the first semester of 1987, they generated leasing transactions equivalent to
P123 million (Lirio 1987). Leased assets mostly consisted of motor vehicles, and business
equipment and office machines. Admittedly, the total leasing volume generated by leasing
companies had gone down tremendously right after the 1984-1985 economic crisis. It
started to pick up only in the last two years when the economy grew fast.
There are at least three factors that adversely affect the growth of leasing
transactions. The first is the 10 percent value added tax (VAT) slapped on goods to be
leased. This increases the cost of the lessee. The present VAT system discriminates against
leasing transactions in that a borrower who buys an equipment through a loan can
immediately use the VAT in relation to his other VAT requirements while in the case of
a lease, it is the financial institution (as owner/lessor) who buys the equipment and the
t same cannot use the VAT but recoups the VAT through the lease rental payments (Lirio
b 1987). The second factor is that leasing firms are not allowed to lease capital goods with
a value of more the; 30 percent of unimpaired capital. This is in effect the single
borrower's limit for leasing companies. Indivisibility of capital goods constrains them under
this regulation from going into highly profitable leasing transactions. The third factor is that
leasing companies are only allowed to sell their receivables to banks, investment houses,
) and other financial institutions. They are not allowed to float bonds to raise funds from the
) public. Borrowing from the public is limited only up to 19 creditors. Thus, the growth of
their resources is severely constrained.)
Venture capital corporations in the Philippines started only in the early 1980swhen
banks were allowed to invest in these corporations up to a maximum of 60 percent of the
total equity. The rest were contributed by two separate government-owned corporations.
They were created to facilitate the movement of long-term funds to SMEs. There was a
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spurt in the growth Of venture capital corporations in the initial years. The government's
incentive in terms of equity participation was one of the factors that attracted private banks
to set up their own venture capital corporations. However, the unprofitability of the
business that was affected by the recent economic crisis prompted some investors to close
their venture capital corporations. Thus, the number of venture capital corporations has
been dwindling from 17 in 1985 to 13 in 1988. Four more were in the process of
liquidation in 1989. As of December 1988, the aggregate resources of venture capital
corporations amounted only to P100 million. Half of their assets consisted of investments,
but most of these were in high-yielding Treasury bills. Venture capital corporations in the
Philippines are not real venture capital corporations like those that have emerged in the
USA, Japan and Korea which promote and commercialize ideas concerning technological
innovations. Most of the equity participation and loans of Philippine venture capital
corporations went into companies/projects that have nothing to do with the
commercialization or application of new technology.
The capital market is the least developed market in the Philippine financial system.
The resources in the non-securities market are very thin and only large firms have access
to them. In the stock market, there are only 147 listed firms at present, 62 of which belong
to the top 1000 corporations in the country. The two stock exchanges are more like
gambling casinos than a market for trading securities.
C. Current Monetary.and Credit Policies
From the 1950s to the 1970s, cheap credit policy had been pursued to encourage
more investments in the fledgling economy. Monetary policies had been designed to
support this policy. First, ceilings on lending rates were imposed. Second, the rediscount
rate of the Central Bank was set at a bargain rate, making the Central Bank a "lender of
first resort" instead of a "lender of last resort." There was a variety of rediscount rates for
more favored priority sectors, including the MCSMEs which obtained the lowest rediscount
rate. Third, the government heavily participated in the credit markets through its own
specialized banks.
Referring back to Figure 1, this policy virtually turned financial institutions into
"one-armed" entities because they became heavily dependent on cheap funds from the
Central Bank and National Government and failed to mobilize deposits as real financial
institutions should do. The effect of this policy on the development of the financial system
may be seen in Table 8. The Philippine financial system has remained shallow compared d
to those of Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. The wide margin between the rediscount and
prescribed lending rates offered financial institutions ample opportunities for "rent-seeking
behavior." This was aggravated by the Central Bank's policy of restricting bank entry and
branching. Insider abuse, i.e.,diverting cheap government funds to the business concerns
of bank owners and other related interests, became widespread. It led to the collapse of i
several financial institutions (Lamberte 1989).
Reforms in the financial system were initiated earnestly in the early 1980s. Upon
assuming power in 1986, the new government further accelerated the much needed financial
reforms. These are embodied in the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan,
1986-1992. The reforms were aimed at strengthening ti_estabilization function and, at the
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Table 8
M/GNP IN SELECTED ASEAN COUNTRIES
Country : 1975 : 1980 : 1985 : 1987
:..... : o
Indonesia : 0.16 : 0.18 : 0.26 : 0.31
Malaysia : 0.46 : 0.54 : 0.67 : 0.75
Philippines : 0.17 : 0.21 : 0.21 : 0.22
Singapore : 0.60 : 0.66 : 0.70 : 0/85
Thailand : 0.34 : 0.39 : 0.60 : 0.67
Korea, Rep. of : 0.31 : 0.34 : 0.39 : 0.41
Taiwan : 0.56 : 0.64 : 1.08 : 1.32
M = M = M = quasi money
3 1
Source: Key Indicators of Developing Member Countries of ADB Vol.
XVII-July 1987; Vol. XIV-April 1983; Vol. XVIII-July 1988
Vol. XVIX, July 1989, cited in Tan (1989).
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same time, shedding off the development function of the Central Bank. Efficiency in
intermediation is to be achieved through improved competition in the system. In particular,
freer entry into all areas of banking and finance to enhance the efficiency of financial
intermediation has been allowed as expressed in CB Circular No. 1188. From May to
December 1989,the Centi:alBank already approved 54 applications for branches from banks
(23 from commercial banks, 18 from thrift banks, and 13 from rural banks). A savings
bank's application for a commercial banking function has also been recently approved,
These reforms are meant to increase financial intermediaries' loanable funds through
deposit mobilization.
The Central Bank has also spelled out a policy towards improving the stability and
soundness of the banking system by refraining itself from sustaining weak banks as it used
to do in the past. This is to gain surplus units' confidence in the banking system so that it
would be easier for banks to mobilize deposits. Special privileges and subsidies given to
government-owned banks have gradually been phased out to force them to become
competitive.
The determination of the interest rate is now left to market forces. More
importantly, the rediscount policy of the Central Bank has been changed. At present, a
uniform rate that is aligned with the market rate is charged on all rediscounts with the
Central Bank, thus ending the era of preferential treatment for some sectors of the
economy including the MCSMEs. This is also a signal that the Central Bank now gives
greater emphasis on savings mobilization, thus changing itself into a truly lender of last
resort. It now has a better control over money supply movements and, therefore, inflation.
In the past four years, the growth in money supply had been moderated, partly to comply
with IMF conditionalities. As a result, a single-digit inflation rate had been achieved
throughout the period, except in the last few months when supplybottlenecks became more
pronounced (Figure 7). This was further aggravated by additional "cost-push"pressures
arising from the rise in the price of oil and the recently legislated increase in the minimum
wages.
The policy reforms also led to changes in the strategy in providing financial support
to MCSMEs. The Plan specifically states that: "Focus shall be directed toward increasing
MCSMEs' access to financing through a market-oriented interest rate policy" (p. 153). The
shift in policy takes cognizance of the view that the problem of MCSMEs is not so much
the price of credit but access to it. Moreover, subsidized credits are mostly enjoyed by
those who can afford to pay the market rate rather than by those who need the subsidy
most, as found out by Llanto and Neri (1985).
The authorities have recognized the adverse impact of some regulations on
intermediation cost. A gradual reduction in the reserve requirement ratio and abolition of
the agri-agra requirement and gross receipts tax have been planned to reduce bank
intermediation costs. Between 1986 and 1988, the Monetary Board twice reduced the
reserve requirement ratio on deposit liabilities with original maturities of 730 days or less
from 23 percent to 21 percent. For deposits with maturities over 730 days, the reserve
requirement was reduced to 5 percent from 6 percent in 1986. However, in lune 1989, the
Monetary Board raised the reserve requirement of deposits with original maturities of more
than 730 days from 5 percent to 7 percent. This will eventually be aligned with that of the
short-term deposits. More recently, however, the reserve requirement ratio for all types of
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MONTHLY INFLATION RATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1987-1989
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deposits had been raised to 22 percent as a reaction to rising inflationary pressures
experienced by the economy in the last few months and also, to meet the reserve money
target included in the IMF conditionalities. Going back to equation (5) as mentioned
earlier, the reduction in intermediation cost that might result as inflation rate declines may
partly be offset by an increase in the reserve requirement ratio. Thus, the domestic lending
rates are likely to remain high for quite some time unless both the inflation rate and the
reserve requirement ratio on deposits are reduced.
Regarding the Central Bank's proposal to abolish the agri-agra requirement and
gross receipts tax, Congress has not yet acted on them. As a whole, the reforms virtually
left the intermediation cost untouched. With very high intermediation cost, it is not
surprising then that the bank lending rates have remained high at between 25 to 35 percent,
with small and medium enterprises that have access to bank credit obtaining the higher
rate.
Perhaps the most disturbing policy that has been adopted by the monetary
authorities is defending the value of domestic currency in the face of a deteriorating trade
balance. This is made possible by pursuing a high interest rate policy. The biggest casualty
of having an overvalued currency and a high interest rate is the export sector, which also
includes many small direct and indirect exporters (Lamberte ,t°t. 1989). They are hurt in
two ways. First, they pay an interest rate on their loans that is much higher than if the
exchange rate is not defended; and second, they receive lower exchange rate for their export
earnings than they should have had the exchange rate been left to seek its own level.
D. Special Credit Programs for MCSMEs
Special credit programs are instruments for directing credit to specific sectors. The
present government seems to be ambivalent with regard to its policy towards special credit
programs. On one hand, it consolidated 20 separate agricultural loan programs into the
Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF), which is used solely as a guarantee fund.
On the other hand, it has maintained and even allowed the proliferation of special credit
programs in the last four years. The Agricultural Credit Policy Council (ACPC) listed 35
major on-going programs for credit assistance as of January 1990. Four credit programs
have been inadvertently excluded in the list. In the following discussion, focus will be made
only on those credit programs that wholly or partially eater to the MCSMEs. At least 16
direct lending programs and 3 credit guarantee programs for MCSMEs have been identified.
IGLF is included in the first group because it is essentially a lending than a guarantee
program. Note that one-half of the 16 direct lending programs for MCSMEs were created
after 1986. The detailed profiles of these programs are presented in Annexes A. 1 to A. 12.
Meanwhile, the features and performance of the 16 direct lending programs will first be
analyzed.
1. Direct Lending Programs
The special credit programs were created for different purposes. Some of them
have broad objectives such as generating livelihood opportunities, while others have very
specific objectives such as providing PVOs with revolving funds for lending to micro
enterprises. There is no relationship between the range of objectives and total financial
resources of theprograms. That is, some well-funded programs have broad objectives while
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resources of the programs. That is, some well-funded programs have broad objectives while
others have very specific objectives. Admittedly, many of these credit programs have similar
broad and specific objectives and are serving practical!y the same clientele.
The funds for these special credit programs come from various sources such as the
National GovernmeNt, government-owned corporations specifically SSS which has always
had excess funds, multilateral donors, and agencies of foreign governments. Funds from
the National Government and government-owned corporations are mere reallocation of
domestically available resources to priority sectors while those that come from foreign
sources are considered as addition to domestic resources. Note that foreign funds come
into the country in the form of foreign loans to the National Government, which bears the
exchange risk since loans to ultimate borrowers are disbursed and repaid in domestic
currency. In the end, soft foreign loans may turn out to be cosily if the domestic currency
is sharply depreciated against the currency in which the foreign loan is denominated.
Almost all the initiators of the special credit programs are non-financial institutions.
They are either regular government agencies or government-owned corporations. The
implementors of the programs are not necessarily the same initiators. There are two types
of program implementors, namely, financial and non-financial government institutions. The
latter setup has some cost disadvantages over the former since a new administrative
structure that includes credit evaluation and collection department has to be put up, not to
mention the lack of expertise of the personnel in handling credit programs. The
administrative cost is often not reflected in reports of these programs, which makes it very
hard to calculate the social costs of these programs. The implementing agencies are all
located in Manila. Unlike government financial institutions that have several branches
outside Metro Manila, non-financial program implementors do not have such facility.
Hence, despite the claim by all special credit programs for MCSMEs that they have
national coverage, their presence in the provinces is hardly felt at all by target borrowers
(Lamberte ,,.q 1989). There is also a disadvantage if such programs are implemented
by government financial institutions. That is, the availability of funds would make them less
willing to mobilize deposits from private depositors.
One innovative approach to the delivery of credit to the MCSMEs that the Plan
suggests is the use of private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and non-government
organizations (NGOs) as "credit conduits of these financing facilities." Like informal
moneylenders, PVOs/NGOs deal with their clients in a more personal basis and over time
accumulate adequate information about them that could help ensure high repayment rates
on their loans. Several PVOs/NGOs have already incorporated a credit facility in their
package of services to MCSMEs. Thus, it is just a matter of increasing their resources so
that they can service more clients. Some newly-created special credit programs took this
cue and are now using PVOs/NGOs as lending conduits. Besides ensuring high repayment
rates on loans and seeing to it that the loans would go to their target clientele, this
approach substantially reduces transactions cost in administering the credit programs since
wholesale loans are lent to PVOs/NGOs, which in turn retail them to MCSMEs, compared
to the approach in which the program implementors distribute small loans to sparsely
located clientele. There are, however, issues related to this approach that need to be
addressed. One is that it involves some implicit subsidies provided by PVOs/NGOs in the
delivery of credit to MCSMEs for the government. It is well known that most PVOs/NGOs
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have volunteer officers and staff. Another one is sustainability. Over time, su:6_.ssful
PVOs/NGOs have to grow and assume a more formal character to service the growing
number and demands of their clientele, thereby losing their comparative advantage over
banks. In another vein, the strength of PVOs/NGOs may have been sustained only by the
presence of dedicated leaders who are willing to work for the organization on a voluntary
basis. When they leave, the PVO/NGO they are working for may not find similarly
dedicated leaders.
/,'
Other special credit programs use as conduits private financial institutions, which
arc given the responsibility of approving and collecting loans under certain guidelines given
by the initiators/implementors of the programs. However, not all financial institutions
automatically qualify as conduits of these funds. They have to beaccredited first, which
means that they have to satisfy certain criteria formulated by the initiators/ implementors
of the credit programs. For some programs, the criteria for accreditation are so restrictive
that only a few financial institutions could qualify. The spread between the cost and lending
rate of the channelled funds provides private financial institutions with an incentive to
implement the programs. There is therefore a natural tendency for them to depend heavily
on these funds than on mobilized deposits if the spread they obtain from channelled funds
is large. This now leads to the next issue-- the price of credit.
As already mentioned in the previous section of this chapter, the government's
effort to increase MCSMEs' access to credit has to be done under a market-oriented
interest rate policy. It is even explicitly stated in the Plan that "All remaining forms of
interest rate subsidies to specific sectors (including the government) through the Central
Bank credit facilities shall be eliminated" (p.47). However, most of the existing special
credit programs do not pass through the Central Bank. Being beyond the reach of the
Central Bank, these programs have the discretion to determine the price of their loanable
funds.
It has been mentioned above that some programs lend directly to MCSMEs while
others course the funds through participating financial institutions and PVOs/NGOs. For
the latter, it is necessary to distinguish between the interest rate charged by the programs
to intermediaries and to final borrowers, i.e., MCSMEs. Of the five programs that lend
directly to MCSMEs, three fix the interest rate below the market rate while the remaining
two use the market rate. Of the remaining nine programs that course the funds through
participating financial institutions and PVOs/NGOs, some variation in the interest policy
being applied can be observed. Three programs fix the lending rates to their target
clientele below market rates. The other six programs fix the interest rate on funds they
lend to intermediaries but leave the latter to determine their lending rate (which is usually
the market rate) to final borrowers. In this arrangement, the intermediaries reap the
subsidies granted by the special credit programs. For PVOs/NGOs, the subsidies
compensate partly, if not fully, the implicit subsidies they confer to their clientele while for
financial intermediaries, the subsidies are fully captured by them. Comparing the interest
rate that intermediaries pay for the channelled funds and the prevailing market rate, it can
be concluded that the subsidies they enjoy from such programs are not insignificant.
One program, i.e.,IGLF, aligns the interest rate it charges on the funds it lends to
participating financial institutions to the market rate. However, it follows a two-track
interest rate structure on the funds it lends to participating financial institutions -- one is
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fLxed and the other is variable with the former higher than the latter -- and discriminates
between borrowers located in well-off and depressed regions in the country, with the latter
receiving a subsidy.
It is indeed very difficult to assess the performance of the various credit programs.
In the first place, information about the performance of the programs are not readily
available to the public in published form. For instance, reports about income and
expenditures of most of the programs, especially those that are managed by regular line
agencies, could not be easily obtained. Secondly, several of them have multiple objectives.
This is further complicated by the fact that some objectives are so broad. Thirdly, while
some programs identify both the intermediate beneficiaries (conduits of the funds such as
PVOs and NGOs) and ultimate beneficiaries (i.e., the ultimate borrowers), there is no
assurance that the conduits will direct the funds to target beneficiaries unless rigorous
verification, which would increase the cost of implementing the program, is regularly done.
This type of information (not mere reports of intermediaries) is what is needed but is not
readily available from most programs.
Apart from reaching the target beneficiaries, these directed loan programs also have
to be sustainable. Two important indicators of sustainability are high repayment rate and
low past due ratio. As shown in Annexes A. 1 to A.12)several programs provide these
pieces of information. Others have just star_ and, therefore, have not encountered these
problems. Reported repayment rates range from 61 to 100 percent. Majority of the
programs obtained repayment rates of more than 90 percent. However, the reported past
due ratios of most programs are alarmingly high. This is reminiscent of several special
credit programs for agriculture that could not be sustained due to high default rates
(Lambert¢ and Lim 1987).
2. Credit Guarantee Programs
As mentioned above, there are three credit guarantee programs for SMEs, namely,
the Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises (GFSME), the Philippine Export
and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (Philguarantee), and the USAID-supported credit
guarantee program.
The first--GFSMD-supports projects that are directly or indirectlyengaged in food
production, up to one level of backward or forward integration or linkage, like small scale
food processing industries. It has four regular subsystems, namely, guarantee, mortgage,
interest rate subsidy,and liquidity. The last two subsystems are going to be phased out.
Three newly-created facilities axe now being added to the regular subsystems. Those are:
CALF-GFSME guarantee facility, farm machinery dealer discount line facility, and
LIVECOR-GFSME guarantee facility which is an extension of the LIVECOR's loan
program for non-agricultural livelihood projects. The orientation of GFSME is towards the
smaU and medium enterprises (i.e., those projects with assets of not less than P82,500 but
not exceeding P10 million after financing). It excludes from the program cottage industries
and microenterpfises. It also requires that all loans be covered by a collateral.
GFSME principally operates through a network of accredited financial institutions
composed of commercial banks, development banks, rural banks, and thrift banks (Table
9). Lately, it has accredited two nonfinancial NGOs which have been providing financial
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Table9
THE GUARANTEE FUND FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTEPRISES (GFSME)
OPERATING HIGHLIGHTS
As of 2 January 1990
i. Accredited Banks
Commercial Banks 8
Development Banks 6
Rural Banks I0
Thrift Banks and
Other Financ'l Inst. 17
TOTAL 41
II. Distribution By Loan
Size No. Amount % to Total
P 50,000> = LOAN < = P 500,000 ---> 82 22,752,250.00 27.33%
P 500,000> = LOAN < = P 1,000,000 ---> 77 65,318,085.75 25.67%
P 1,000,000> = LOAN < = P 2,000,000 ---> 68 106,658,500.00 22.67%
P 2,000,000> = LOAN < = P 5,000,000--~> 66 212,705,604.06 22.00%
P 5,000,000> = LOAN < = P 10,000,000 ---> 7 47,198,745.29 2.33%
P i0,000,000> = LOAN < = P 20,000,000 ---> 0 .00 .00%
TOTAL 300 454,633,185.10 100.00%
III. Distribution By Project Sites No. Amount % to TOTAL
Region I (Ilocos) i0 17,525,000.00 3.85%
Region II (Cagayan Valley) 1 50,000.00 .01%
Region III (Central Luzon) 79 126,134,750.00 27.74%
Region IV (Southern Luzon) 99 112,984,766.00 24.85%
Region V (Bicol) 2 3,000,000.00 .66%
Region VI (Western Visayas) 72 122,834,840.00 27.02%
Region VII (Central Visayas) 12 14,580,000.00 3.21%
Region VIII (Eastern Visayas) 0 .00 .00%
Region IX (Western Mindanao) 1 3,360,000.00 .74%
Region X (Northern Mindanao) 3 2,850,000.00 .63%
Region XI (Southern Mindanao) 9 18,195,000.00 4.00%
Region XII (Central Mindanao) 0 .00 .00%
National Capital Region 12 33,118,829.10 7.28%
TOTAL 300 4.54,633,185.10 100.00%
Source: GFSME
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services to their clients. GFSME provides 85 percent cover of the amount of the individual
loans, with the remaining to be shouldered by the aecredited institutions. The loan size
averaged P1.6 million. Seventy-five (75) percent of the 300 loan accounts were below I>2
million. The projects are concentrated in Regions HI, IV, and VI. As of year-end 1989,
GFSME's past due rate posted 8.02 percent. 3 The recent shift in its focus in target
clientele from the traditional agribusiness entrepreneurs to the smaller farmholdexs, while
desirable, given the government's recently-implemented comprehensive agrarian reform
program, will adversely affect SMEs' access to bank credit unless the slack will be picked
up by another institution.
Meanwhile, unlike GFSME, the second program, the Philguarantee, carries only a
guarantee program for export-oriented enterprises. It offers two major faeilities, namely,
the general guarantee facility, which is for guarantee of more than I)5 million; and the
export credit lxogram for small and medium industries (ECGP-SMI), which is for
guarantee of P5 million or less. The former has remained inactive for more than three
years now due to the huge losses Philguarantee incurred while the latter still continues
operating. Only accredited banks can tap the guarantee facilities. Philguarantee provides
a maximum guarantee coverage equivalent to 70 percent of the approved credit facility.
The ECGP-SMI program excludes cottage industries and micro enterprises since
it caters only to small- and medium-size enterprises with assets of between P500,000 and
P20 million. It also excludes small- and medium-size enterprises that are producing solely
for the domestic markets. Examples of such enterprises are those belonging to the metal
working industries. Since its inception, the ECGP-SMI facility has reached only a limited
number of clientele. As of 1989, the number of accounts outstanding was only 13 (Table
10). Its default rate posted 8.8 percent.
The third credit program refers to the one being supported by USAID. Introduced
in 1985, the program allows four major Philippine banks to provide small and medium size
enterprises with export or agriculture loan guarantees up to a total ceiling of $2.4 million
for each bank.4 Table 11 shows the participating banks, the features of the program, and
beneficiaries of this program. Eligible loans are provided with a 50 percent guarantee
cover. Accordingly, it is popular among participating banks because of its administrative
simplicity and automaticity of guarantee coverage and guarantee payment. However, it
has a very limited impact on improving SMEs' access to bank credit in general since it
confines itself to only four participating banks. Moreover, like the two previous guarantee
programs, it is not clear whether it has really facilitated SMEs' access to bank credit or
whether banks simply tap it to provide themselves with additional protection.
E. MCSME Situationer
Like her neighboring countries, the Philippines relentlessly pursued an import-
substitution industrialization strategy beginning in the early 1950s. High tariff rates, import
3Past due raw is ©qual to th© sum total of d©layed paym©nts, accounts with guarantee called, and the outstandlng balance of
accounts in litigation divided by the total outstanding balance of all accounts.
4This part draws heavily on the report by Rhee et al. (1990),
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Table 10
PERFORMANCE HIGHLIGHTS OF PHILGUARANTEE
(In Million Pesos)
: 1980 : 1985 : 1989 : Total
: : : S
Guarantees Outstanding, : - : 53.0 : 37.9 :
Beginning : : : :
Add: Guarantees, Issued : : : :
for the year : 29.7 : 18.9 : 12.9 : 348.7
(Net of Extensions) : ...... : : ...... :
Guarantees Outstanding, : : : :
for the year : 29.7 : 71.9 : 50.8 : 348.7
: : Z :
Less: Previous Guarantee : : : :
Accommodations : - : 13.6 : 4.8 : 164.2
: ...... : : ...... :
Net Guarantees Outstanding, : : : :
for the year : 29.7 : 58.3 : 46.0 : 184.5
Less: Cancelled Guarantees : - : 15.4 : 13.6 : 121.2
Guarantees Outstanding, : : : :
Before Defaults : 29.7 : 42.9 : 32.4 : 63.3
: : Z :
Less: Guarantees in : : : :
Default : - : 10.0 : - : 30.9
: ...... : : ...... :
Guarantees Outstanding, : : : :
Ending : 29.7 : 32.9 : 32.4 : 32.4
Number of Outstanding : : : :
Accounts : 24 : 35.0 : 13.0 :
Source: Philguarantee
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Table 11
LOANPORTFOLIOGUARANTEEPRIVATESECTORREVOLVINGFUNDOF USAiD
THEPHILIPPINES AS OF SEPTEMBER30f 1989
Funding (H) Term Disbursement
Project
Name of Bank Loan Rate Grace Period Term $ _ Description
1985 obligated Projects
Far East 8amk & Trust 1 2.0 3 year 15 yrs. 5 yrs 20 M 100 Guarantee generates
T-note at Least $4 million
plus .1_ in credit to small
m_dmdium-sized
pre-export firm.
1986 Obligated Projects
Bank of the Philippine
[stands 2.4 90 Day 2 yrs. 55 yrs. O O Guarantee generates
T-Bill $4.8 million to finance
plus .6_ small aM medium-sized
rural agri-business.
• J
Metro Rank 2.1 90 Day 2 yrs. 55 yrs. 500,000 26 Guarantee generates
T-Bill $4.2 million to finance
plus 5X. rural Lending.
Philippine Commercial
International Rank 2.4 90 Day 2 yrs. 55 yrs. 24 M 100 Guarantee generates
T-Bill $4.8 million to finance
plus .375_ rural tending to small
and mediumenterprises.
19_ Obligated Projects
Far East Bank and Trust il 2.186 3 Month 24 mos. 6 yrs. 0 Guarantee generates
T-Bill from $4.372 million in loans
plus .6_ first to business importing
disburse U.S. capital goods
-n_nt
Source: AID, Private Sector Revolving Fund. Annual Report Fiscal Year 1988.
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controls, overvalued exchange rate, and low interest rates were the main policy instruments
used to support that strategy. The overalt policy environment induced the creation of large,
capital-intensive industries that absorbed much of the limited financial resources of the
country. Since most of the basic infrastructures were concentrated in Manila and the
neighboring cities and provinces, the import-substituting industries located themselves in
these areas. While in the 1960s, neighboring countries like Korea and Taiwan switched to
an outward-looking development strategy, the Philippines continued with its inward-looking
development strategy up to the first half of the 1980s. 5
The MCSMEs were heavily penalized by the development strategy pursued by the
Philippines in the past. Interestingly, despite macroeconomic policy biases against MCSME,
they still have continued to fioudsh and have remained a major sub-sector in the economy.
Out of an estimated number of 5,294organized manufacturing establishments in the country
as of 1986, 89 percent were considered small and medium establishments. 6 They can be
found practically in all industrial sectors although they tend to concentrate in the food,
wearing apparel, leather and leather products, printing and publishing, and machinery
industrial sub-sectors. Their contribution to employment is by no means small. Out of the
636,219 employed in the manufacturing sector in 1986, 29 percent were in the small and
medium enterprises. They contributed 17 percent to the total census value added of the
manufacturing sector which was estimated at P97 billion in 1986. Small and medium
enterprises are well dispersed geographically compared to large scale industries which are
heavily concentrated in Metro Manila. Of the total number of small and medium
enterprises, 44 percent are located outside Metro Manila. Most of them have to deal with
Ix)or infrastructure.
How did MCSMEs finance their business? Available pieces of evidence suggest
that the initial capital mainly came from their own savings, inheritance, and informal
sources (Table 12). But as they became more established, ploughed back profits became
the main source. Still, own savings remained a significant source of funds in the subsequent
years. Interestingly, the proportion of those who had access to the formal sources of credit
increased over the years as MCSMEs successfully built their good track record. There is
evidence that small firms have been operating profitably which made them decide to re-
invest their profits. Thus, they grew faster (Lamberte 1990). This evidence is portrayed
in Table 13. In particular, nominal assets of a typical small firm had been growing at 44
percent per year. In 1986, the firms included in the sample realized an average net monthly
income of P14,388, implying an average rate of return on assets of 54 percent. This
compares with the 56 percent average rate of return on assets realized by the top 50
corporations in the country for the same year.
Although small firms grew faster mainly through self-financing, access to bank credit
at the start of business counts a lot in determining their asset growth and labor-absorptive
capacity. Table 14 compares the performance of small firms with and without access to
bank credit. As shown, the assets of those which have access and those which do not have
SRefer to C'haptcr 11I for a related dia:ussion on this.
6The figures here are taken from UP-i$$1, Small and Medium-Scale F.v_rpr_e_ in the Philipphtes: An Over_ew, 2ad Revised
Edition (Diliman, Q.C.: UPlSSI, 1989).
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Table 12
SOURCES OF FINANCING
Subsequent Initial
Sources of Investment/Years No. % to No. % to
total total
(230) (230)
Own Investment
Own savings 185 71.2 206 88.6
Inheritance 29 12.6 38 16.5
Profit re-investment 203 98.2 3 1.3
Others 5 2.1 - -
Borrowings
38.1 22 8.5
Formal Sources 90
Informal Sources 52 22.6 28 12.6
* Multiple response
Source: Salazar, Melito S. et al., "Financial Factors and Small
and Medium Enterprises," in Kenneth James and Narongchai
Akrasanee (eds.), Small and Medium Business Improvement in the
ASEAN Region: Financial Factors (Singapore: ISEAS, 1986).
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Table 13
PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS
: : Standard
Item : Means : Deviation
1. No. of years in operation : 11.6 : 9.4
2. Total assets : :
Start (pesos) : 60,573 : 243,623
Present (pesos) : 321,748 : 1,108,060
• m
3. Average monthly sales in 1986 (pesos) : 79,125 : 557,908
4. Average monthly net income in 1986 (pesos) : 14,388 : 93,071
sources: Lamberte, Mario B., "Impact of Special Guarantee
Programmes for SMEs on Employment and Productivity."
Paper presented during the Conference on"Strategic
Approaches Toward Employment Promotion," 21-23 March
1990. Manila, Philippines.
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Table 14
PERFORMANCE AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY INDICATOR OF FIRMS WITH AND
WITHOUT ACCESS TO BANK CREDIT AT THE START OF BUSINESS
With : No
Item = Access : Access
-. ........ _-_ .......... _
I. No. of years in operation : 11.70 : 10.77
2. ASsets = :
a. Start* : 131,164 : 49,786
: 2
b. Present* : 810,032 : 246,096
3. Total number of workers : :
:
a. Start* : 10.33 : 8.49
:
b. Present* : 22.00 : 10.55
4. Monthly gross revenue/sales, 1986 : :
(in pesos) : 88,824 : 78,168
5. Monthly net income 1988 (in pesos) : 14,090 : 14,494
6. Assets per worker (in pesos) : :
a. Start* : 17,684 : 9,220
b. Present* : 44,240 : 21,981
: z
7. Monthly gross revenue per worker, 1986 : :
(_n pesos) : 6,058 : 4,981
8. Monthly net income per worker,_1986 : :
(in pesos) : 1,068 : 1,008
*Significant at one percent level.
Sources: Lamberte, Mario B., "Impact of Special Guarantee
Programmes for SMEs on Employment and Productivity."
Paper presented during the Conference on "Strategic
Approaches Toward Employment Promotion," 21-23 March
1990. Manila, Philippines.
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access to bank credit were growing fast rapidly over the years, but their difference has
widened in favor of the former. The same can be said of their labor absorptive capacity.
• While it is shown above that •accessto bank credit is crucial for the growth of small
firms, many have argued that loans to MCSMEs should be below market rate so thattheir
profitability would not be undermined. The general view being held is that MCSMEs
cannot afford to pay the prevailing market interest rate which is excessively high. Available
evidence, however, suggests that interest cost is only a minor component of the total cost
of production of SMEs which are proned to borrowing from informal sources (Table 15).
Lamberte and Jose (1988) found similar results in the case of small footwear manufacturers
which already had been paying between 60 percent to 115 percent per annum for their
loans from informal sources. This only shows that high interest rate is not a major
deterrent for small firms to borrow. For them, access is more important than the price of
credit.
HI. MONETARY POLICY, FINANCE AND CREDIT PROGRAMS FOR SM_-_IN
JAPAN, KOREA AND TAIWAN
This chapter reviews monetary policy, finance and credit programs for small and
medium enterprises (SMEs) in Japan, Korea and Taiwan and tries to draw important
lessons from their experience. It should be pointed out at the outset that SME
development programs, whether explicit or implicit, in these countries are part and parcel
of their overall industrial development strategy. Monetary policy and credit programs are
just supporting instruments in that overall strategy. Ideally, the effects of monetary policy
on the local economy are neutral to all sizes of firms. However, if other maeroeconomie
policies such as trade, industrial and fiscal policies, tend to have differential impact across
sizes of firms, then monetary policy will likely reinforce such bias. The worst ease is when
monetary policy is also made to conform to such bias at the outset. Thus, certain groups
of firms will be left out in the development process. Countervailing measures then become
a necessity. This issue will be raised again as the experience of the abovementioned
countries in developing and supporting their SMEs is reviewed.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first reviews the monetary policy,
finance and credit programs for SMEs of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan; and the second
discusses some lessons from the experience of these countries for SME development in the
Philippines.
A. Monetary Polic_. Finance and Credit Prozrams for SMI_.qin !_9__"_.K_,2r_---._T:_-,;,-:.-i
1. The Case of Japan
The Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law of Japan defines SMEs in terms of
both number of employees and capital which varies by type of industry. For
manufacturing/mining industries, SMEs are those with 300 employees and below and a
capital of Y100 million and below; for wholesale enterprises, 100 employees and below
and a capital of Y30 million and below; and for retail/service, 50 employees and below
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Table 15
COST COMPOSITION, 1986
Cost Items : Percent :
Labor : 22.6 :
Interest : 3.8 :
a
Materials : 51.9 :
Rent : 2.8 :
Transportation : 7.5 :
Others : 11.5 :
Total : i00.00 :
source: Lamberte, Mario B., "Impact of Special Guarantee
Programmes for SMEs on Employment and Productivity,"
Paper presented during the Conference on "Strategic
Approaches Toward Employment Promotion," 21-23 March
1990. Manila, Philippines.
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and a capital of Y10 million and below.7 Although Japan has achieved one of the highest
levels of economic development in the world today, the contribution of SMEs to her
economy is by no means small. As of 1986, SMEs contributed 57 percent to the total
value added of all manufacturing industries and 81 percent to the total number of employed
persons. Japan has a well-developed subcontracting system that helps maintain the
relatively large contribution of SMEs to her economy. As of 198t, 65 percent of the total
number of SMEs acted as subcontractors (Yokokura 1988).
The Japanese government has practically steered the growth and development of
SMEs through specific policies and programs. Changes in policies and programs have been
prompted by changes in the general economic environment. The post-war period may be
divided into three distinct sub-periods which were characterized by specific set of policies
and programs for SMEs. Enactment of laws and establishment of specialized institutions
catering for the SMEs were the major instruments.
In the first sub-period, which covers the period between the end of the Second
World War and the mid-1950s, policies for SMEs were generally passive in the sense that
they were confined to responding to the needs of SMEs for their survival. Access to credit
was considered the crucial factor for their survival. Thus, during this period, the Japanese
government organized several specialized financial institutions which provided cheap credit
to SMEs frable 16). A\credit guarantee program was also established to guarantee the
borrowings of SMEs from private lending institutions. However, loans were not given
indiscriminately. Rather, they were granted to SME borrowers who were deemed to have
greater probability of repaying the said loans (Yokokura 1988). Apart from facilitating
SMEs' access to credit, the Japanese government also sought to protect SMEs from the
onslaught of competition waged by large firms while at the same time, stimulated
competition among SMEs by regulating the activities of SME associations. Subcontractors
were well protected by law against unfair transactions that might be imposed by parent
fLrmswhich have undue advantages over them.
In the second sub-period, which includes the years starting from the mid-1950s
through the 1970s, the Japanese government attempted to modernize the operations of
SMEs and at the same time, encouraged them to increase their size. AU this was aimed
at increasing SMEs' capital-labor ratio to increase their productivity and at the same time,
to allow them to cope with the rapidly risingcost of labor. Enactment of laws, establishment
of credit facilities/institutions, tax measures, and technical assistance programs were the
major instruments utilized to cant out the objectives of the SME promotion policy.
There were at least two developments that should be noted. One, was that the
lending facilities had been decentralized by allowing the prefectural governments to serve
as credit conduits for SMEs. The other was the establishment of the Japan Small Business
Corp. which provides both financial and technical assistance to SMEs. Its specific tasks
are as follows:
1) Guidance and financing for the structuralupgrading projects of SMEs;
2) Personnel training for SMEs;
7"the pe_o/y_m ra_ u of I0 April 1990was 0.142.
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Table 16
SME POLICIES IN JAPAN
Period/Laws/Institutions Specific Purpose
1. End of WW II - mid-1950s Passive and protected policies
were developed to save SMEs
a. People's Finance Government financial institution
Corp. (1949) that specialized in SME financing
b. Small Business Finance Government financial institution
Corp. (1953) that provided long-term funds
to SMEs
c. Shoko Chukin Bank The Central Bank of Commercial and
(1936) Industrial Cooperatives which was
used as a conduit of government
funds
d. Credit Guarantee Guarantees borrowings by SMEs form
Corporation Law (1953) private financial institutions
e. Credit Insurance Guarantees the liabilities of the
Program (1950) credit guarantee associations
L Small and Medium Developed further cooperative
Enterprises Cooperative activities in associations
Association Law (1949)
g. Small and Medium Regulated activities of SME
Enterprises Stabil- associations
ization Law (1952)
h. Department Store Restricted the activities of
Law (1956) department stores and
cooperatives in retailing
i. Law on Special Measures - same as above -
for the Adjustment of
Retail Business (1959)
j. Law on the Prevention Regulated transactions where a
of Delay in the Payment parent firm can utilize its
of Subcontracting dominant position in transaction
Charges and Related to unfairly impose unprofitable
Matters (1956) conditions on subcontractors
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Table 16 (coat'd)
Period/Laws/Institutions Specific Objectives
2. Mid-1950s through 1960s Active modernization policies
were introduced for modernizing
facilities and increasing the
scale of SMEs
a. Facilities Modem- Provided financing facilities to
ization Capital Lend- SMEs seeking to modernize their
ing Program (1954) operations
b. Law on Financing and Permitted the central government
and Other Measures to provide grants to the
for Aiding Small and prefectural governments for
Medium Enterprises loans to SMEs
(1956)
c. Small and Medium Enter- Provided financing and tax
prise Modernization measures in a more systematic
Promotion Law (1963) and organized fashion than in
the past for the modernization
of facilities and the
consolidation of firms
d. Small and Medium Provided the basis for the next
Basic Law (1963) two laws
e. Small and Medium Expanded the Enterprise
Enterprise Guidance Consulting Program
Law (1963)
f. Small Business Invest- Provided financing for
meat Company Incorp- inoreasing capitalization
oration Law (1963) of SMEs
g. Public Procurement Permits SMEs to obtain orders
Law (1966) from the government and other
public agencies
h. Japan Small Business Provided one body for the
Promotion Corp. (1967) counseling and financing
of SMEs
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Table 16 (cont'd)
Period/Laws/Institutions Specific Objectives
3. From the 1970s onwards Policies emphasize the
building up of "soft"
management resources for
advancing"knowledgv-
intensity" in SMEs and
assisting firms to change
their line of business
a. Revisions of the Small Emphasizes the development of soft
and Medium Enterprise management resources such as the
Modernization Promotion development of new products and
Law (1973, 1975) technologies and of human
resources. Also introduced
programs for structural adjust-
ment through firms switching
their line of business
b. Law on Temporary Provides financing and tax breaks
Measures for Line-of- for firms to change their line
Business Conversion of business
by SMEs (1976)
e. Law on Temporary - same as above -
Measures for SMEs in
Specific Depressed
Regions (1978)
d. Law on Temporary - same as above -
Measures for Regional
Small and Medium
Enterprises
e. Large Retailer Restricts entry by large firms
Law (1973) into the domain of SMEs
f. Industry Opportunity - same as above -
Law (1977)
Source: This is culledfromthe paperof TakashlYokolmta,"SmallandMediumEnterprises,"
in RyutaroKomiya,InduswlalPolicyof Japan (Tokyo:AcademicPress,Ine.,1988).
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3) Collection and provision of information for SMEs;
4) Management of the Mutual Relief System for SMEs; and
5) Management of the Mutual Relief System for Preventing Chain-Reaction Bankruptcies
for SMEs.
The last two programs of the Corporation are something unique. They are designed to
soften the impact of any untoward incident that might befall on the SMEs. The details of
these programs are shown in Annexes B.1 and B.2. The Corporation has six institutes
conducting managerial and training programs for SMEs. It has also an active research
institute which does experimental research on new technologies useful for SMEs. Table
17 shows the general financial condition of the Corporation and its accomplishments as of
March 1988.
The government also worked on the demand side to ensure SMEs markets for their
products. Specifically, it enacted a law encouraging government agencies to purchase
products/supplies produced by SMEs.
In the third sub-period, i.e.,from 1970s to the present, the Japanese economy was
subjected to a number of external shocks. Restructuring was needed to allow the economy
to cope with the new environment. This required the finetuning of SME promotion
policies. More specifically, emphasis was given on the building of "soft" management
resources for advancing "knowledge-intensity" in SMEs and on assisting firms to change
their line of business. The ultimate goal is to push SMEs to enter the age of high
technology producing new products in a more efficientmanner. The restructuring of SMEs
has been accomplished by revising laws promoting SMEs, and by providing better financing
facilities and tax breaks to SMEs willing to undergo the restructuring.
The financial implications of the various SME promotion programs of the Japanese
government from 1960 to 1980 are shown in Table 18. Government budgetary support to
SMEs through the years were not inconsequential. Special financial support to SMEs
provided by the various financing institutions had been large. However, the share of
government financing in total SME financing had been small, not exceeding 13 percent.
This suggests that SMEs in Japan are not very much dependent on government support
when it comes to financing.
In general, SMEs in Japan have access to external finance. However, financial
policies had put them in a disadvantageous position compared to large firms. Teranishi
(1982) pointed out that in postwar Japan, the allocation of long-term outside funds had
been more or less under strict government regulation, and preferentially given to large
enterprises. In particular, the interest rate on long-term loans was subjected to a ceiling,
whereas that on short-term loans was not. Trust funds were confined to lending to large
firms because of the provision in the Long-Term Bank Act that required them to lend only
to safe borrowers. Moreover, only large firms can be listed in the stock exchange and are
allowed to issue corporate bonds. Table 19 shows that there is a significant difference in
the share of long-term sources of outside funds between small and large firms, with the
former depending more on short-term funds. The figures in Table 20 suggest that small
firms substituted short-term funds for long-term funds, and that the degree of dependence
on short-term funds increases as firm size decreases. Table 21 further shows the extent of
the bias of banks towards large firms. All these suggest that while small firms have access
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Table 17
GENERAL FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE JAPAN
SMALL BUSINESS CORPORATION
(As of the end of March 1988)
i. Funds ¥987.8 billion
(Wholly financed by the Government)
2. Balance of loans for the structural upgrading projects of
small and medium enterprises
¥943.7 billion
a. System A ¥679.3 billion
b. System B ¥247.1 billion
c. Land Acquisitions ¥ 17.3 billion
3. Number of persons trained at the Institute of the Japan Small
Business Corporation
91,000 (approx)
a. Managerial training 60,000 (approx)
b. Technical training 31,000 (approx)
4. Number of subscribers in the Small-Scale Enterprise Mutual
Relief System
1,617,000 (approx)
5. Number of subscribers in the Small and Medium Enterprise
Mutual Relief System for Preventing Chain-Reaction
Bankruptcies
257,000 (approx)
Notesz System A - Financing with prefectural government
as a channel
System B - Financing with the corporation as a channel.
Sourcez J.pa.sm_J B_ Co,,po,,_
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Table 18
SMALL BUSrNESS POLICY BUDGET AND OTHER STATISTICS
Fiscal Year 1960 1970 1980
General Budget (¥ million)
i. Promotion of SME modernization 1,475 3,710 8,147
2. Institutions for SME modernization - 26,278 92,034
3. SME consulting activities 711 6,043 40,387
(403) (4,081) (31,247)
4. Financing measures - 11,750 90,300
(-) (18,400)
Total (including miscellaneous items) 2,581 50,318 243,475
FILP investments (¥ i00 million)
5. Small Business Finance
Corporation 315 2,263 15,265
6. People's Finance Corporation 290 2,364 15,066
7. Shoko Chukin Ba_k 30 122 723
8. Japan Small Business Corporation - 204 164
Total (including miscellaneous items) 744 5,523 34,004
Share of goVernment financing intotal
SME financing (%)
9. Fixed capital 29.0 17.9 20.1
i0. Working capital 5.2 6.6 10.3
Total financing (9 + i0) 8.7 9.3 12.6
Note:(1) is for assistance for facilities modernization,
promotionofsubcontractors,andmodernization of SMEs incommerce anseervices;
(2)isforinvestmentS in and subsidiesfor theJapan Small Business
Corporation; (3) is for assistance for small enterprise counseling, for
consulting and internship programs, for technical consulting and subsidies
for promoting R & D, and for organizational policies; (4} is for
investments, subsidies and loans to the three government small business
financial institutions, loans to the Credit Insurance Corporation, and loan
guarantees; For (3), the figures in parentheses indicate amounts for small
enterprise programs and for (4}, amounts for the program for financing
small enterprise management reform; financial shares are as of year end
for the outstanding balance of all the loans to SMEs by all financial
institutions.
Source: Takashl Yokokura, "Small and Medium Enterprises," in Ryutaro Komiya
_ (eds.). l_t_alPoli_Jap_ (Academic Press, Inc., Tokyo: 1988).
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Table 19
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF CORPORATE FINANCING AND INVESTMENTS
(1963-1967)
Japan U.S.A.
Large Business Small Business Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(A) Sources of
Funds i00.0 i00.0 99.8 i00.0
Short-term funds
(1) Short-term
borrowings
from finan-
cial inter-
mediaries 24.0 19.6 24.4 4.8
(2) Net trade
credit - 30.4 3.6 -
Long-term funds
(3) Long-term
borrowings
from finan-
cial inter-
mediaries 22.6 11.3 19.6) 29.6
(4) Issue of
corporate
bonds 5.5 0.0 3.6)
(5) Issue of
stocks 11.5 5.7 i0.0 i0.0
(6) Retained
earnings 7.8 8.7 8.9 40.9
Others 28.8 24.3 29.7 13.4
(B) Uses of Funds 100.0 100.0 i00.0 i00.0
(7) Fixed assets/
investments 51.8 34.7 49.4 57.5
(8) Liquid assets
investments
other than
trade credit 31.4 65.3 50.6 32.9
(9) Net trade
credit 16.8 -
i
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Table 19 (p.2)
Japan U.S.A.
Large Business Small Business Total(1) (2) (3) (4)
(C) Ratio of long-
term outside
funds to fixed
assets invest-
ments (3) + (4)
+ (5)/(8) _6.4 49.0 6_.2 _1.1
(D) Ratio of long-
term funds to
fixed assets
investments
(3)+(4)+(5)+
(6)/(8) 91.5 74.1 65.2 142.3
Notes: (1) Average of 1963 - 67.
(2) For Japan, corporate firms of all industries. Small
(large) businesses are with less (more) than 100
millions yen paid-in capital. For USA,
manufacturing corporations.
(3) There is a minor change in the number of firms
covered during the perios, so that figures are
approximate ones.
Source: Juro Teranishi, "A Model of the Relationship Between
Regulated and Unregulated Financial Markets: Credit
Rationing in Japanese Context," Hitotsubashi Journal of
Economics Vol. 22, No. 2 (February 1982).
49
Table 20
DESIREDANDREALIZEDCOMPOSITIONOF CORPORATEFINANCING
FROMOUTSIDEBY SIZE OF BUSINESS(1968)
(In Percent)
One billion yen 100 million yen 50 million yon 10 million yen 10 million yon
Scale of Business and up one billion yen 100 million yen 50 million yen and down
by paid*in ......................................................................................
capital realized, desired realized desired realized desired realized desired realized desired
Short-term Funds
(1) Short-term
borrowings 7.3 7.8 23.1 16.9 25.1 16.5 27.7 14.8 33.7 20.2
(2) Trade credit 2.8 1.8 3.6 1.8 3.9 3.5 8.6 3.6 12.9 3.9
Long-term Funds
(3) Long-term
borrowings 73.7 73.0 61.0 67.8 55.0 64.1 47.7 (#_.8 35.4 53.9
(4) Issue of bonds 3.8 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0
(5) Issue of stocks 7.2 9.3 3.1 83 2.2 9.1 4.2 10.6 2.2 10.7
No answer 5.3 3.0 9.1 5.2 13.9 6.1 11.9 5.8 15.7 11.2
(7) Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: (1) ResuLt of interviews with 1,932 with businesses by the Ninistry of Finance.
(2) Each percentage is the share of numberof businesses for which the most important source
financing (realized and actual) corresponds to each item.
Source: Juro Teranishi, "A Model of the Relationship Between Regulated and Unregulated Financial Narkets: Credit
Rationing in Japanese Context," Hi_ubas/_Joem_ofEcormedcs VoL. 22, No. 2 (February 1982).
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to external finance, they pay a higher price for these funds compared to large finns. The
price differential has been brought about mainly by the existing financial policy. The
various special lending programs for SMEs can then be viewed as a way to neutralize such
policy bias. But as shown above, only a small proportion of total SME financing was
accommodated by the various government special lending programs. This seems to suggest
that the financial instrument has very little impact on the promotion of SMEs in Japan.
Other policy instruments such as technical assistance, tax reliefl competition-restricting
measures, enhancing market opportunities, etc., could have more substantial impact on their
profitability so much so that they can well afford the high interest rate on short-term funds.
This also implies that the Japanese financial markets are well-functioning to accommodate
credit demands from various industries. Thus, there is still no better substitute for having
well-developed financial markets when it comes to providing funds for SMEs. Of course,
the historically conservative monetary policy pursued by Japan which produced very low
inflation rate has tremendously helped her financial system in mobilizing deposits.
Japan is now in the process of developing a venture capital industry to provide more
equity investment in emerging, technology-based SMEs. The government led the promotion
of venture capital corporations as early as 1963. But the industry suffered a setback during
the first oil shock in the early 1970s. It started to recover only in 1982. Accordingly, Japan
is currently in the midst of her second venture capital boom (Kotzmetsky ,to1. 1985). Most
venture capital enterprises in Japan are subsidiaries of private banks and securities firms.
Capital gains to private investors are not taxed in Japan. Thus, private investors have
adequate incentive to invest in venture capital enterprises. Financing is not a critical
barrier to the development of the Japanese venture capital industry. Rather, the lack of
skills to implement U.S. venture capital techniques, cultural barrier to entrepreneurship and
scientific research, and the lack of an exit vehicle in the form of either a new issue market
or a mergers and acquisitions market have seriously impaired the development of its
venture capital industry. MITI is now trying to support the growth of the industry by
providing subsidies to research and development up to 50 percent of the company's R&D
expenditures and by developing an over-the-counter market as an exit vehicle.
2. The Case of Korea
Korea basically followed the economic philosophy of Japan, that is, heavy
government intervention to steer her economy. Right after the Korean war, Korea pursued
an import-substitution development strategy. In the 1960s, Korea adopted an outward-
looking development strategy. The growth of large scale, export-oriented industries was
expedited through government policies (Woo 1985). Like Japan, the policy for SME
development pursued by Korea in this period was prompted by the need to neutralize the
industrial policy bias against SMEs. Thus, financial institutions like the Small and Medium
Industry Bank and the Citizens National Bank were established. Their impact in terms of
stimulating growth of SMEs waswhowever marginal. Thus, SMEs remained a shadow of
the rapidly developing large industries. While continuing its export-orientation, focusing
on labor-intensive goods, a second import-substitution phase that concentrated on heavy
industries was launched in the 1970s. Trade and financial policies were the major
instruments used to achieve the objectives of this policy. SMEs were then further starved
of the much needed funds. Unlike Japan, her financial markets were less developed. So,
SMEs turned to the curb market. It would appear that sufficient funds were made available
from the curb market; the progressive narrowing down over the years of the curb market
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interest rates and the lending rates of banks would support this view (Ho 1980). Thus,
SMEs in Korea survived the policy bias. Then, towards the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
Korean government sought to increase the contribution of SMEs to her economy by
developing technology-oriented small and medium scale industries. The 10-year Long-
Term Promotion Plan which was launched in 1982 intends to increase the value added
contribution of SMEs from 35.4 pexcent in 1982 to 44.8 percent in 1991; and the
employment share from 47.7 percent to 54.3 percent. The trade reforms and financial
liberalization (particularly interest rate deregulation, reprivatization of national banks, and
freer bank entry) initiated by Korea in the early 1980s will further force SMEs to be
competitive both in the goods and financial markets.
Unlike in Japan, SMEs in Korea are determined on the basis of the number of
employees which varies by industry. In manufacturing, mining, transportation services and
other related industries, medium enterprises are those with less than 300 full-time
employees, while small enterprises, less than 20 full-time employees; in construction,
medium scale enterprises are those with 200 full-time employees or less, while small
enterprises, 20 full-time employees or less; and in commerce and services, those with 20
employees or less are considered medium, while those with 5 employees or less are small.
Korea practically followed the approach used by Japan in promoting SMEs. She
developed a legal framework for implementing SME development policies. The laws
enacted ranged from the creation of specialized financial and non-financial institutions that
provide f'mancial and technical assistance to SMEs to regulating transactions between
parent and subcontractors to protect the latter from any unfair practices perpetuated by
the former (Table 22). She established the Small-and Medium-Industry Promotion
Corporation (SMIPC) which is equivalent to the lapan Small Business Corporation. It
carries the following programs:
1) The modernization program;
2) The equipment leasing program;
3) The business start-up program;
4) The rural industry development program;
5) Cooperative program;
6) Extension services;
7) Training services;
8) Information services; and
9) International Cooperation program.
The first four programs include the provision of financial assistance to SMEs.
Other financial assistance to SMEs are being offered by several specialized financial
institutions and special lending programs. Most prominent among the financial institutions
are the Small and Medium Industry Bank and the Citizens National Bank. The features
of the lending programs of these two banks are given in Annexes C. 1 and C.2. Interestingly,
nationwide commercial banks are required to allocate at least 35 percent of their total
loanable funds to small enterprises while local banks must lend at least 55 percent of their
total loanable funds to SMEs. It is not surprising then that as of 1982, total bank loans
(including those of the Small and Medium Industry Bank, Citizens National Bank,
commercial banks, and local banks) to SMEs already reached 45 percent of the total loans
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Table 22
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR PROMOTING SMEs IN KOREA
1. The Small and Medium Industry_Basic Law provides for the definition of small
business and supports establishment of small businesses. This law also encourages
business conversion and pioneers new line of products.
2. The S_all and Medium Industry Promotion Law stipulates the establishment of
SMPC in order to support modernization and cooperative programmes for the SMI
sector.
3. The Small and Medium Industry Coo.oeratives Association Law prescribes for the
establishment of sub-co-operatives and regulates co-operatives operations.
4. The Small and Medium Industry Systematization Promotion Law provides incentives
for the development ,of parts and components industries and encourages
subcontracting and sound and fair business practices between large firms and
components suppliers.
5. The Small and Medium Industry Business Coordination Law stipulates norms for co-
ordination and strengthens small business co-operativesautonomous power to make
business co-ordination.
6. The Law on Payments for the Products supplied from Small and Medium Industries
regulates unfair practices in subcontracting and stipulates the period of payments and
due interests on delayed payment by large firms for supplies from SMIs.
Source: UNIDO, Small Industry Bulletin for Asia and the PaeO_c,UN No. 23, 1958=
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for SMEs (Woo 1985). More than half of it were contributed by commercial and local
banks. It is not however clear whether all the reported loans really went to the SMEs.
Loan diversion was apparently rampant in Korea as in other countries that have similar
loan portfolio allocation policy.
There are a number of special credit programs for SMEs in Korea. At least five
of them whose features are summarized in Annexes C.3 to C.7 have been identified. It is
worthwhile to note that they put emphasis on the provision of long-term funds to SMEs
at below market rate using financial institutions as conduits. The performance of these
programs is not, however, known. Apart from these lending programs, a guarantee, program
also provides support to SMEs. It does not distinguish its beneficiaries between export-
oriented and domestic-oriented industries. The features of this program are given in AnnexC.8.
Korea is now in the process of developing her venture capital industry to provide
equity financing to emerging SMEs. But unlike Japan, the major venture capital
corporations in Korea were created by the government through special laws. There are four
major venture capital corporations in Korea that provide financing to SMEs in the form of
venture capital to encourage and nurture R&D-odented companies. The first is the Korea
Technology Advancement Corp. (K-TAC) which is affiliated to and fully funded by the
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology CKAIST). It is engaged in
commercializing the new technologies developed by KAIST. The second is the Korea
Technology DeveloPment Corp. (KTDC). It is funded and managed by the private sector
with substantial financial support from the Korean government and the World Bank. The
third is the Korea Development Investment Corp. (KDIC). Its funds came from seven
private financing companies and the IFC. The fourth is the Korea Technology Finance
Corp. (KTFC) which was established by the Korea Development Bank (KDB). Unlike in
Japan, financing seems to be a critical barrier to the development of the venture capital
industry in Korea. This explains the heavy participation of the government and multilateral
agencies in the four major venture capital corporations. Table 23 gives a summary of the
funding methods of the four venture capital corporations. One key factor that helps sustain
the viability of venture capital corporations is greater selectivity of the projects to be
funded. For instance, KDIC's acceptance rate is only 12 percent of the total number of
applications.
A venture capital corporation is not expected to earn a profit in its initial years of
operation because of the long gestation period required of its investments. This seems to
be the ease of the four Korean major venture capital corporations. They incurred losses
in their first few years of operation but later on realized some profits (Table 24).
Support for the development of privately-owned venture capital corporations has
recently been intensified with the passage of the Small and Medium-Sized Venture Business
Creation Act in 1986. Financial and fiscal incentives are given to venture capital
corporations organized under this Act. The response from the private sector has been
overwhelming considering the fact that in two years time, 15 corporations have been
established under this Act.
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Table 23
VENTURECAPITALFUNDINGNETNODS
: : : financing limit : repayment method, interest rate : objects of funding
: ...... : .............................................. : ..................................... . .... : ..............................
: KTDC: : :doatestic financing :repayment of equally divided installments :companies which develop new
: : :conventional:of 500 mit. won (tess : within 10 years :technetogies, manufacturing
: : :loans :than 70X of the :(including a grace period of 3 years) :of new products, foundation
: : : :necessary financing) :4 times a year in domestic currency, 2 :of plants and facilities,
: : : : :times a year in foreign currency, an :technology transfer
: : : :foreign currency :annual interest rate of 10 -11X :improvement of productivity
: : loans : ............ :financing of 1.5 mit. : .......................................... :and quality
: : :conventienat:$ (about 1 bit. 350 :Pay loyalty at a fixed rate if the :
: : :loans :mit.) (IOOZ of the :venture succeeds.
: : : :necessary financing) :Repay the minimumamount if the venture :
: : : : :fails :
: : ..................... : : .......................................... :
: : equity investment : :allotment of profits, if any :
: KTFC : : :500 _,it. wen (loans; :repayment of equally divided quarterty :risky high-lath industries
: : :conventional:tess than 80_ of the :tnstattmants uithin 10 years (including a :with insufficient collateral
: : :loans :necessary financing, :grace period of one third of the tending :such as sMi-cenductovs,
: : : :investment; less than :period), an annual interest rate of 13-14_:colq=uters, precise chemistry
: : : :50_ of the total stocks): .......................................... :and ceramics
: : loans .............. :Pay royalty if succeedede
: : :cenventionat: :Repay the minimumamount if failed :
: : :loans : : :
: : ..................... : ........................................... : "
: : equity investment : :allotment of profits, if any :
: KDiC : equity investment :600 mit. won (tess than :profit allotment, if any withdrawal of :R & D new technology
: : :50_ of the capital) :the capital within 5-6 years, the :transfer, commrclatization
: : : :venture, if succeeds :of neM technoLogy, product
: : : : :diversificatien, management
: : : : :rationotizatien and facility
: : : : :expansion
:K-TAC : equity investment :500 Bit. Men (less than :profit attotmlnt, if any uithdrawat of ,:comaercializatien of
: : :50Z of the coBpany's :the capital within 5-6 years , if the :government research
: : :capital) :ventures succeed :institutes export proamtien,
: : : : :foreign technology transfer
: : : : :and coamerciatizstien for
: : : : :iq;x)rt substitution
source: Korea Technetogy Oevetopment Corporation. " A Study on the Effect Of KTDC#s
Financing Activities." February 1986.
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3. The Case of Taiwan
Taiwan adopted development strategies in the 1950s and 1960s similar to those of
Korea. It was import-substitution strategy in the 1950s, then export-oriented strategy in the
1960s. Unlike Korea, however, Taiwan did not go to the second phase of import=
substitution in the 1970s. Instead, she continued her outward orientation. In the 1980s,
Taiwan started to focus on technology=intensive industries just like Japan and Korea.
Among the three countries, Taiwan has the least interventionist policy towards the
promotion of SMEs. There were attempts to organize special creditprograms for SMEs,
but these were less funded compared to those of Korea. In fact, it was only in 1976 that
the government established the Small and Medium Industries Bank. Technical assistance
programs for SMEs were likewise less organized compared to that of Korea. The
development of SMEs were then left to the mercy of the prevailing macroeconomic policy
framework. Despite this, SMEs flourished in Taiwan.
There is a big difference between the industrial structures of Korea and Taiwan.
Korea is built on a few, large industries that are geographically concentrated in urban
centers whereas Taiwan is built on a great number of small.and medium f'Lrmsthat are
geographically dispersed. That is, Korea's industrialization has been associated with
expansion in the size of relatively small number of firms whereas that of Taiwan's has been
associated with a proliferation in the number of small firms (Levy 1987). This is attributed
to the role played by traders in the two countries. The growth in the manufacturing sector
in Talwan was accompanied by a parallel growth in the number of traders. This was not
the case in Korea which eventually limits the opportunities provided by a few traders to
small industries. This may be attributed to divergent incentives offered to individual firms
in these two countries. As already mentioned earlier, Korea offered substantial incentives
to large firms inducing Korean firms to enter the market at relatively large size. In
contrast, Taiwanese firms receiving less incentives than Korean firms start small.
In general, monetary policy in Taiwan was biased against her SMEs. The interest
rate control oniy aggravated SMEs' access to bank credit. But the informal credit markets
in Talwan that served the SMEs were quite large. In fact, the difference between the curb
interest rates and the lending rates had narrowed significantly in Taiwan, suggesting that
sufficient funds were available from the informal credit markets (van Warmelo 1967).
Perhaps, the negative impact of macroeconomic bias against SMEs is less pronounced in
Taiwan than in Korea. One of the reasons is that when Taiwan began to industrialize,
rural infrastructure was already amply provided, clearly benefiting rural-based industries.
This facilitated subcontracting, which is widespread in Taiwan, between parent firms located
in urban centers and subcontractors located in rural areas. As pointed out by Levy and
Kuo (1987), Taiwanese firms across a wide range of industries enter easily into
subcontracting relations with one another. The recent financial liberalization in Taiwan is
expected to boost further the growth and development of her technology-intensive SMEs.
B. Lessons from the Exnerience of Japan. Korea anti Taiwan
From the above discussions on the various approaches to promoting SMEs in three
Asian countries, Taiwan seems to have the least interventionist approach. Recently,
however, she tried to assume a more active role with the purpose of encouraging SMEs to
58
switch into technology-intensive industries. In contrast, Japan has a long history of
substantial government intervention in the promotion of SMEs. Korea seems to follow
Japan's approaches but she is grappling with the fact that her industrial structure is built
on large firms that had been induced by past industrialization policies. And unlike Japan
and Taiwan, she does not yet have a well-developed subcontracting system.
As the monetary policies of the three countries that affect SME development as
well as their finance and credit programs were being discussed, one cannot help but notice
their familiarity. It is because the Philippines has almost all those policy and programs for
SMEs. In fact, some special credit programs for SMEs in the Philippines, e.g.,the IGLF,
preceded those of Korea. Nevertheless, there are still a lot of lessons that can be drawn
from the experience of Japan, Korea and Taiwan in SME promotion. These are discussed
below.
1. It is clear by now that macroeconomic policy affects the development of SMEs.
This is reinforced by monetary policy. For instance, the ceilings on interest rate only served
the interest of large firms especially in capital-scarce economy. Countervailing measures
such as special credit programs that are intended to neutralize the adverse impact of
monetary policy on SMEs have very limited impact. For instance, in Japan, government
financing in total SME financing has remained small, implying that SMEs rely more on
other sources of credit than on government-funded credit programs.
2. When it comes to increasing the flow of credit to SMEs, there is still no substitute
to a stable monetary policy. In Japan, inflation rates have historically been very low due
to their conservative monetary policy. This induces surplus units to save in financial forms.
This could be one of the reasons why Japan has one of the highest saving rates in the
world. With adequate mobilized funds, SMEs in Japan have less difficulty in accessing
credit from private financial institutions.
3. Lack of credit does not seem to be an insurmountable obstacle to the development
of SMEs as long as funds are available from institutional or non-institutional sources even
if they are priced at market rates. In Japan, cheap long-term funds were preferentially
allocated to large firms. But SMEs turned for their additional financlal requirements to the
short-term credit markets in which lending rates were not controlled. Short-term funds
which were made readily available to borrowers by private financial institutions substituted
for the long-term fund requirements of SMEs. In Korea and Japan, SMEs banked on the
curb markets for external financing.
4. If the government were serious in promoting SMEs, then it should start with an
appropriate legal framework that could be changed from time to time depending on the
existing economic environment. This is the experience of Japan that is being emulated by
Korea. The legal framework sets the tone for the creation of institutions and programs
for S/VIEdevelopment. It may include competition-enhancing measures such as regulating
activities of associations; measures to protect SMEs against undue advantages of large firms
especially in the sub-contracting system; market-expansion measures such as allowing SMEs
to obtain purchase orders from government agencies; and tax incentives to encourage
SMEs to improve their productivity. The Philippines has yet to devise a legal framework
for SMEs so that they can operate in a more favorable environment.
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5. SMEs are in need of a champion. Japan and Korea responded by creating an
autonomous body which is not charged of recommending policies but rather takes care of
providing basic services to SMEs. The Japan Small Business Corporation is more advanced
than the Small and Medium-Industry Promotion Corporation of Korea in terms of the
variety of services and degree of sophistication of the services provided to SMEs. But the
difference merely reflects the degree of sophistication of their economies and their
priorities. The provision of low-interest credit is only one of the services offered by these
corporations. Technical assistance and training programs appear to be the more important
services provided by these corporations.
The Philippines appears to be not too far behind Japan and Korea in terms of the
number of special credit programs and institutions providing technical assistance and
training programs for SMEs. However, these are small, highly fragmented, uncoordinated
and overlapping with each other. There is no real lead agency that SMEs can look up to.
6. No matter how small the impact of special credit programs in relaxing SMEs' access
to institutional credit is, they are considered part and parcel of the SME promotion
programs of Japan and Korea. There are two important features of their lending programs.
One is that these programs focus on the provision of long-term funds to SMEs. It should,
however, be noted that this type of lending program will only be sustainable in the long-
run if the economy is stable. Otherwise, the program will not be able to regenerate for
itself long-term funds that might be lent to other SMEs. The other feature is that access
to those funds is not automatic. In the case of Japan, the repayment capacity of borrowers
is given emphasis. The same is true of Korea which showed high rejection rates for some
programs. Only meritorious projects were being funded. All these show that lending
programs should exercise greater selectivity especially since funds are fairly limited. These
features are perhaps worth looking into in pushing for special credit programs for SMEs in
the Philippines.
7. In view of the limited resources of the government for direct lending programs, a
government-sponsored credit guarantee can help expand SMEs' access to institutional
credit. Both Japan and Korea have a strong, financially sound credit guarantee program
managed by an independent corporation. The program does not discriminate between
export- and domestic-oriented industries. In the Philippines, the Philguarantee limits itself
to direct exporters while GFSME is increasingly concerned with the agriculture sector.
IGLF is not a real guarantee program.
8. A new method of providing long-term funds to emerging SMEs that wish to utilize
newly-developed technology has been developed in Japan and Korea in the form of venture
capital corporations. This is a way of ensuring that these countries are in the lead pack in
this "high-tech age" through the Support of firms wishing to push the frontiers of
development. In Japan, the government led the promotion of the venture capital industry
which is now dominated by the private sector consisting mostly of banks and securities
firms. Tax breaks to private investors were adequate incentives for them to place their
funds in venture capital corporations. In contrast, Korea opted to establish by law ventur_
capital corporations with funding from the private sector, government and foreign donors.
But more recently, Korea is trying to stimulate the development of the private venture
capital industry.
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In the Philippines, the type of venture capital corporation is similar to that of Japan
in thatthey are adjunct to banks and run by the employees of the parent banks. Bank
employees are used to short-term analysis which is different from the real venture capital
concept of nurturing a business over a certain number of years. It is not therefore
surprising that Philippine venture capital corporations went into traditional lines of business
for quick profits. The 40 percent equity participation by government also makes it similar
to those of Korea in terms of sources of funds. With the scarcity of funds of the
government, what may be attempted by the Philippine government is to develop real
privately-funded venture capital corporations by granting private investors tax breaks such
as exemption from capital gains tax. Additionally, the Philippine government should
seriously consider developing incubators to be based in private or state universities to
"assist technically-oriented entrepreneurs in developing their business skills in an
environment that simultaneously stimulates technical creativity" (Kotzmetsky aot. 1985;
p. 54).
IV. ASSESSMENT OF PENDING BILLS IN CONGRESS
So far, Congress has passed one bill which was signed into law by the President
(R.A. No. 6810 also known as "Kalakalan 20"), providing some fiscal incentives to micro
enterprises and cottage industries in exchange for their staying above ground. It is still
too early to measure the success of this legislation since guidelines were only issued this
year. However, there are already some skepticisms raised by various quarters about the
usefulness of the measures in the bill. In the first place, why should those that are
operating in the underground economy register to avail themselves of fiscal incentives that
will be withdrawn after five years of registration when they are not paying taxes anyway
at the moment? Why should they register if they are going to be subjected to existing
labor codes upon registration? Since micro enterprises and cottage industries are not
dealing anyway with any government agency, then the reduced bureacratic red tape brought
about by the law would not benefit them.
Since there is only one bill passed related to MCSME development, and none of
its provisions relate to the financing of MCSME, this chapter will instead make a critical
assessment of pending bills in Congress that have some beating on MCSME. Only those
bills that include some provisions related to monetary, banking and credit policies will be
analyzed here.
Judging from the number of pending bills in Congress that directly or indirectly
affect MCSME development, it can be said that there is a serious effort on the part of
legislators to provide a legal framework for policies and programs for MCSME
development. To date, at least 16 bills (9 from the House and 7 from the Senate) have
been identified as under review by Congress. To facilitate analysis, the key features of the
various bills are summarized in Table 25. They may include lending, credit guarantee, and
technical assistance programs as well as fiscal incentives for MCSME; propose concessional
rate for the loans; recommend the creation of a new agency to implement the provisions
of the bill; suggest the appropriate implementing agency; and identify sources of funds. A
blank in Table 25 means that the bill concerned is silent on that particular feature. In the
discussion below, those that indirectly address the concerns of MCSMEs will be presented
first. Then, from among those that directly address the concerns of MCSMEs, those bills
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Table 25
CONGRESSIONALBILLS RELATEDTO MCSMEDEVELOPMENT
Number Title Important Features
...........................................................................................
Lending Guarantee Concessional Tax Technical New Agency Imptementors Sources of
Rate Incentives Assistance Funds
HOUSEBILLS
7868 Granting incentives to
new, small-scale and
necessary home industries
by granting them tax
exemptions and other
assistance, and for
other purposes x DTI
16261 An act to assist and
develop small and medium
enterprises, owned and
controlled by citizens
of the Philippines, and
for other purposes x x x x x D71 (lead) Existing
programs
appropriations
17418 An act revising the
Rural Banks Act x Gov't.
subsidy
19510 An act establishing a
special fund for the
development of small
scale industries to be
known as the rural
investment and
develol_nent fund x x x .DTI/NEDA Excise taxes
21608 An act creating the micro,
cottage, smelt and medium
enterprises bureau in the
Depatrtment of Trade and
industry and providing
funds therefor. DTI Appropriation
22848 An act promoting the
development of home and
small*scale cottage
industries in the
Philippines and appropriating
funds therefor x x x DTI Appropriation
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Table 25 (cont'd)
i
Number Title Important Features
Lending Guarantee Concessionai Tax Technical New Agency Implementors Sources of
Rate Incentives Assistance Funds
HOUSE BILLS
23514 An act to assist, promote
and develop small and
medium enterprises owned
and controlled by citizens
of the Philippines and
for other purposes x x x x x New agencies Existing
programs
Appropriations
23992 An act creating the national
livetihood development
authority thereby
institutionetizing the
livelihood movement of
the Phitippines x x x x New agency Existing
programs
PAGCOR
25748 An act to promote, develop
and assist small-scale
enterprises through the
creation of a small and
medium enterprises policy
(SMEP) council, the
conversion of the Bureau of
Small and Medium Business
Development as the council
secretariat thereof and
,other purposes x x New agency
SENATE BILLS
202 An act to provide maximum
rates of interest to loans
up to the amount of ten
thousand pesos x
474 An act creating a taw on
usury by providing for the
rates of interest and other
charges that may be corrected
for the loan or forbearance
of money, goods, or credits
and for other purposes x
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Table 25 (cont'd)
,..i
Number Title ImportantFeatures
...............................................................................................
Lending Guarantee Concessional Tax Technical NewAgency ]mplementors Sources of
Rate Incentives Assistance Funds
SENATEBILLS
638 An act fixing the rate
of interest upon Loans of
fifty thousand pesos
or less, providing
penalty for violation
thereof end for Other
purposes x
786 An act to encourage the
participation and
strengthening the role
of non-goverrvnent
organizations in national
development, and for
other purposes x x x x* Implementing
agencies
1189 An act. establishing a.
system of regional universal
banking, and for other
purposes x x x* Central Bank Private.
sector
1258 An act to rationalize and
promote small enterprises,
establish a credit and
guarantee corporation, provide
funds therefor, and for other
purposes x x x x x x New agency Approo
: priations,
IGLF
1368 An act establishing alternative
credit and loan associations,
appropriating funds therefor and
for other purposes x x x DSWD Appro-
priations_
member
groups
* Private agency/institution
64
that are less comprehensive will be dealt with first, to be followed by the more
comprehensive ones.
There are three bills (i.e., SB 202, 474, and 638) that in effect propose the return
of the usury law by putting a cap on the nominal interest rate on institutional and non-
institutional loans. Two of the three bills have very limited coverage in that they intend to
protect only small borrowers by defining the maximum amount of loans to be covered in
the proposed law, while the remaining bill has a comprehensive coverage in that it covers
all loan transactions regardless of size and source of funds. If effective, these proposed laws
could considerably help MCSMEs. In reality, however, it would be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to administer the provisions of the proposed laws since they involve
transactions in the informal credit markets that are significantly numerous. It may well be
that the huge additional cost may not justify the activity. In Chapter II, discussed the
adverse consequences of interest rate ceilings on the small borrowers' access to credit were
discussed. The evidence for the Philippines that was pointed out supported this view. In
the three countries reviewed in Chapter III, the pieces of evidence also showed that SMEs
are rationed out as a consequence of the low interest rate ceilings on loans. Under high
inflationary period, the real lending rate could be negative. This could further constrict the
supply of funds available for MCSMEs. In brief, imposing ceilings on interest rate would
only end up hurting the supposed beneficiary of the law. If these laws were passed, the
Philippines will be the only country that is going back to the era of financial repression. The
country's experience as well as those of other countries regarding financial repression
proved to be not at all beneficial to small borrowers.
There are two bills that seek to strengthen banking sub-systems especially those that
cater to the needs of rural areas. As discussed in the two preceding chapters, a sound
banking system serves the interest of MCSMEs since the latter would have greater access
to bank credit. Japan's SMEs heavily rely on the private banking system which has ample
supply of loanable funds mobilized from surplus households. HB 17418 proposes to revise
the Rural Bank Act. There are several laudable features of the bill. One is that it suggests
that rural banks be allowed to invest in allied undertakings. This will forge a closer linkage
between the rural bank and borrowers since the former can provide other services to the
latter. This is one of the best ways for rural banks to gather more information about the
creditworthiness of borrowers. It will also reduce transactions cost on both the rural bank
and borrowers. Total equity investment in allied activities should however be limited to 25
percent to ensure that rural banks' primary mandate of providing loans be given adequate
attention. The other good feature of the bill is that it proposes to allow rural banks to
devote a portion of their loanable funds to small business enterprises with capital
investment not exceeding P300,000, which is higher than the P100,000 limit provided for in
the existing Rural Bank Act. The bill should go further in this area by having a provision
that rural banks may lend to any sector provided that the single borrower limit applies.
This will allow rural banks to diversify their loan portfolio, thereby reducing risk. There
are however several undesirable features in the bill. One of them is the proposed unlimited
direct equity participation of the government in rural banks which is inconsistent with the
present policy of privatization. The other is the seemingly automatic provision of long-
term loans to rural banks by any government-owned bank at very low rate. Exempting rural
banks from ownership ceilings which could lead to abuse especially if the bank is controlled
by a single family is another undesirable feature of the bill. Moreover, government subsidy
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in the form of equity participation in or soft loans to rural banks will be captured by a few
families only.
While HB 17418 seeks to amend the Rural Bank Act, SB 1189 proposes to create
a new type of banks called Regional Universal Banks (RUBs). RUBs are actually a special
type of universal bank since they can do what a universal bank can do except that they are
compelled to serve clientele in their chosen region. It is worthwhile to note that the major
concerns of the bill are already being addressed by the recent banking reforms such as the
liberal bank entry and branching policy, privatization of regional branches of DBP, etc.
What is worrisome is that many provisions of the bill run counter to the present banking
policies such as less differentiation among different types of banks, uniform incentives
given to all types of banks, etc. While the establishment of RUB in a particular region
could raise deposits mobilized in the said region, it will not automatically lead to an
increase in loans to that region even if RUB is required to lend all its funds to that region.
The reason is that a bank will always consider viability of the project and the
creditworthiness of the borrower when it decides to lend. RUB might find it unprofitable
to continue its operations if it cannot make use more profitably its excess funds elsewhere.
SB 786 is an interesting legislative initiative in that it recognizes the important role
played by NGOs in development. As pointed out in Chapter Ii, the government has
increasingly relied on NGOs as credit conduits. There are already financial and technical
assistance to NGOs provided by various government bodies. However, these are highly
fragmented and uncoordinated. Also, the government's support to NGOs is minimal
compared to those provided by domestic and foreign donors. Thus, the bill basically
rationalizes and seeks to increase the government's support to NGOs. However, the
creation of an Umbrella Non-Governmental Organization through legislation with the
intention that all government assistance to individual NGOs will be given only upon the
sponsorship of the said umbrella NGO could weaken the effectiveness of existing NGOs,
not to mention the political implication of forming such body. Perhaps, it would be better
to encourage NGOs to form federations and be incorported with the SEC. Existing laws
are already adequate to deal with this situation. Even if in the end, the government has
to deal with several federations of NGOs, still there is a need to rationalize and systematize
all its support programs to NGOs.
The bills which explicitly and solely identified MCSMEs or sub-groups thereof as
beneficiaries are analyzed. HB 7868 proposes to grant fiscal and technical assistance to
home industries, i.e.,those that have initial capitalization of P5,000 or less and employ only
members of the household. These incentives are already provided for in the "Kalakalan 20."
HB 22848 proposes to give DTI a mandate to provide financial and non-financial assistance
to small-scale cottage industries. This bill may not be necessary since DTI is already doing
those proposed activities through its Bureau of Small and Medium Business Development
and Tulong sa Tao Program. HB 21608 recommends the creation of the Micro, Cottage,
Small and Medium Enterprises Bureau under DTI (presumably to replace the existing
Bureau of Small and Medium Business Developmen0 to oversee the MCSMEs in the
country as well as coordinate all government support programs for the MCSMEs. This is
an important step towards developing a true champion for MCSMEs. However, the
mandate of the proposed Bureau appears to be less clear. Also, being a bureau of a
regular line agency could serve as a constraint since it cannot operate flexibly and respond
to the ever-growing demands of MCSMEs. HB 19510 proposes to establish a special fund
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to be lent exclusively to SMEs at an interest rate of not more than six percent per annum.
This just adds to the highly fragmented, special credit programs for SMEs. Also, the
interest rate is too low for the program to become sustainable. Considering that part of
government revenues will be diverted to this fund, it might be worthwhile to re-examine the
merit of this bill.
We now go to themuch more elaborate bills. One is HB 23992 which proposes to
create the National Livelihood Development Authority (NLDA). To be organized as a non-
stock, non-profit corporation, NLDA is given the task to develop, implement, and monitor
a comprehensive national livelihooddevelopment program. It shall have the following
livelihood projects and activities as basic priorities: 1)agricultural crop development; 2)
poultry and livestock development; 3) fisheries development; and 4) small-medium scale
industries. It shall maintain provincial and municipal offices. All livelihood projects,
including the staff and financial resources, of the various government agencies will be
merged and consolidated under the NLDA. Aside from initiating and monitoring projects,
NLDA also provides marketing, technical, training, information, • and financial assistance.
This is by far the most interventionist proposal since aside from giving assistance to its
clients, NLDA also develops and implements livelihood projects, thus denying the private
sector of their primary role in determining for themselves' their own livelihood projects.
The bill has some inherent contradictions. For instance, it proposes to target the poorest
of the poor, yet it provides that only registered corporations, associations, cooperatives dul2_
registered with proper authorities can qualify as beneficiaries of the various programs.
Since marginal households and MCSMEs are not usually incorporated nor affiliated to any
cooperative or association (Lamberte 1990), they cannot therefore qualify as beneficiaries.
Another case in point is its claim that NLDA has a decentralized structure. Yet, projects
and credit assistance of between P50,000 and P1 million need approval from the central
office in Metro Manila.
NLDA must be well funded since it is going to have' a staff in each of the 1,592
cities and towns, not to mention its proposed mandate of granting •loans and credit
assistance to its clientele. As •regards its lending program, it is doubted whether its staff in
each city and town have the necessary skills to handle a credit program. Finally, the
proposal to peg the nominal lending rate at 8 percent will undermine the sustainability of
its credit programs especially since inflation rates in the Philippines have been historically
high and the administrative cost of running such program given the mechanisms proposed
in the bill is likely going to be very high.
HB 25748 recommends the creation of a Small and Medium Enterprise Council
with the Bureau of Small and Medium Business Development of the DTI to be Converted
into its Secretariat. The Council shall be composed of heads of economic line agencies
including the Central Bank and representatives from the private sector. (Surprisingly, the
Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology is not included in the•council,
implying that technological researches for SMEs are not given'due importance.) Its tasks
are to recommend to the President all policy matters affecting S/dEs; formulate
comprehensive SME program; coordinate and integrate various government and private
sector activities relating to SME development; and provide technical assistance, skills and
managerial training programs, marketing assistance, and informationservices to SMEs. One
can immediately observe that the proposed functions of the Council are now being done
or can be accommodated by the NEDA Board. Thus, there i§ no need to pass a law just
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to create a council that would duplicate the functions of an exisiting institution. What
might be done is to improve the Board's mechanism in developing and implementing SME
promotion programs. Even if the Board is not doing nor can accommodate the proposed
functions of the Council, the Council will still be a weak institution to carry out its
objectives. In the first place, the members of the Council include heads of line agencies
who may not have adequate time to work for the Council. The same may be said of the
representatives from the private sector. Secondly, the Council has less flexibility compared
to an incorporated institution. As mentioned in Chapter III, the lead institution in Japan
and Korea that promotes SMEs is incorporated. And thirdly, the track record of the
various councils formed by the government in this country in coordinating plans and
programs of various agencies is not encouraging at all. There are at least two reasons for
this. One is that councils do not have control over resources. The other is that councils
have difficulty commanding loyalty from representatives of agencies which are the subject
of coordination.
HB 16261 also proposes the creation of a Council with most of the functions similar
to that of HB 25748. The Council is also composed of government officials and
representatives from the private sector. Under the council is the Small and Medium
Enterprises Office which, aside from being the Secretariat of the Council, serves as a "one
stop" and information assistance center. Its functions seem to duplicate those of the Bureau
of Small and Medium Business Development. But implied in the bill is that the Bureau will
remain. One difference between HB 25748 and HB 16261 is that the latter proposes to
have under the Council the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Fund. This will
be funded by pooling together resources of all existing lending programs for SMEs. This
is one big improvement over the existing fragmented system of providing credit to SMEs.
It sets a rigorous set of criteria for providing credit assistance to SMEs indicating that
access to its lending facility is not automatic. Unlike the previous bills, I-IB 16261 does not-
encourage lending at subsidized rates. One drawback in the bill, however, is that the
lending program is being managed by the staff of the Council who may not have the
necessary expertise to manage and maintain a sound lending program. This may be
overcome by using private financial institutions as conduits of the Fund, but it might result
in the layering of the cost of funds as what is happening now with the various existing
programs. Another difference between HB 25748 and HB 16261 is that the latter grants
a considerable amount of fiscal incentives to SMEs. Thus, SMEs will at least be at par with
those registered with the Board of investments.
SB 1258 is the Senate's version of a magna carta for MCSME development. It has
several provisions similar to those of HB 16261 especially in the creation of a Council, the
composition and functions of the Council, and fiscal incentives given to SMEs. One of the
important additional incentives to be given to SME_ is the preferential treatment in seeking
order for supply of goods and services from government offices, which is similar to the
preferential treatment given by Japan and Korea to their SMEs. One major deviation of
SB 1258 from HB 16261 pertains to the set of provisions on credit for small enterprises.
In pmfieular, it proposes that all financial institutions set aside 3 percent of their total loan
portfolio for credits to small enterprises and that the Council ensure that the interest rates
shall be kept at concessional and preferential levels. This is tantamount to forcing financial
institutions to subsidize SMEs. As already pointed out in Chapter II, banks would probably
respond to this regulation by charging large borrowers a higher rate to recoup their losses
due to subsidy given to SMEs. Ultimately, large firms subsidize small firms by paying a
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higher interest rate on their loans than the normal rate in the absence of that mandatory
requirement. This is certainly an inefficient way of allocating resources. Moreover, the
track record of mandatory credit allocation for priority areas here and abroad is not very
encouraging. Although on paper, a bank may report full compliance of the regulation, in
reality it may not have complied. And monitoring compliance with the regulation imposes
high administrative cost. Usually, regulatory avoidance is rampant in tightly controlled
markets.
Another important difference between SB 1258 and HB 16261 is that the former
proposes to create the Small Enterprise Credit and Guarantee Corporation. In Chapters
n and III, it was pointed out that there is a need to have a real guarantee scheme that
accommodates both export- and domestically-oriented SMEs. This bill comes close to
answering that need. However, there are some questionable provisions of the bill. One is
that it proposes to create an entirely new guarantee corporation instead of building up on
the existing ones, i.e.,Philguarantee and GFSME. Duplication of functions with the existing
ones are likely to occur. Perhaps, what may be needed is the revision of the charter of
Philguarantee to expand its mandate and increase its resources. In that case, the available
staff and their expertise can be utilized more fully. The other is that it intends to arm the
proposed Corporation with a lending facility. Perhaps, GFSME's experience in managing
both lending and guarantee programs can throw light to this issue. As already pointed out
in Chapter II, GFSME has been gradually phasing out its lending facility and is starting to
concentrate instead on its guarantee program.
In summary, there is now a serious effort towards providing a legal framework for
MCSME development in the country. The number of bills reviewed above attests to this.
This is already a substantial improvement over the past 35 years. However, the bills
reviewed above still leave much to be desired considering the requirements of developing
MCSMEs in this country.
V. POLICY RECOMMF2qDATIONS AND LEGISLATIVE AGENDA
This chapter discusses some monetary, banking and credit policies and present
legislative agenda for MCSME development in the country.
A. Monetary, Banking and Credit Policies
No matter how monetary policy is made conducive to the development of MCSMEs,
it cannot work independently of the rest of macroeconomic policies. The primary task
therefore is to finetune macroeconomic policies such that their biases against MCSMEs
will be reduced, if not eliminated. For instance, protecting an inefficient steel
manufacturing industry would hurt the downstream industries, like the metal working
industry, which consists of many small and medium enterprises. Poor rural infrastructure
facilities adversely affect MCSMEs which tend to concentrate in rural areas where factor
inputs such as labor and raw materials are abundantly available. Taiwan had successfully
launched ,her rural industrialization mainly spurred by SMEs due to the adequacy of
infrastructure facilities in rural areas.
69
As regards monetary policy, a tighter control on the movements of monetary
aggregates is desirable to achieve a stable movement of the general price level. This can
help business formulate long-term investment plans. An appropriate re.discounting policy
and fiscal discipline can help attain this objective.
Banking reforms should continue. Since bank entry and branching is now more
liberal than in the past, the focus of reforms should shift towards strengthening bank
supervision to reduce bank failure. An ailing banking system will have difficulty mobilizing
deposits, hence, there would be less loanable funds for the economy. Credit rationing could
take place; and it is known that in any credit rationing system, small borrowers are being
rationed out. Thus, upgrading the bank examination capability of the Central Bank is
necessary for the strengthening of the banking system. While the bank examination
capability of the Central Bank is being strengthened, the legal framework that governs
bank examination should also be changed. For example, examiners, should be given more
authority to look into DOSRI accounts to prevent abuse l_b'_k owners and officers.
There might be a need to review the regulation pertaining to single borrower's limit
to determine whether it can be granted liberally to some financial institutions in view of the
special character of their business. In particular, finance companies that are engaged in
leasing may be allowed to have a higher single borrower's limit due to the indivisibility of
the capital goods they lease. Leasing is an important alternative source of financing SMEs
which often cannot afford to buy pieces of equipment for their business.
There is a need to review the interest rate policy. As of this moment, interest rate
policy is subservient to exchange rate policy. Any pressure on the exchange rate is being
moderated by increasing the interest rate. Thus, severely fluctuating interest rates have
been experienced by the country. Perhaps, it is about time to let the exchange rate float
freely. Of course, the government must initiate the removal of intermediation taxes. This
could help bring down the rates. Mandatory credit allocation to priority sectors should be
resisted since as argued above, it only results in the raising of the interest rate without
accomplishing its objective.
It is about time that the government makes a stand on the proliferation of small,
special credit programs for MCSMEs. As pointed out in Chapter II, these are
uncoordinated, and many are overlapping with each other. It might be worthwhile to place
them in a pool to be used for specific lending programs that would yield much larger
incremental benefits to MCSMEs. A related discussion on this issue is presented below.
Under the liberal interest rate policy, borrowers perceived to be riskier are charged
higher interest rates by banks. MCSMEs are usually perceived to be riskier borrowers.
If they cannot put up the necessary collateral, which is often the case, then banks would
not accommodate them. Often, the subjective evaluation of banks on the riskiness of the
borrowers diverge from reality. As mentioned in Chapter II, MCSMEs were found to be
highly profitable, yet they encounter difficulty in accessing credit from banks. Thus, it
would be worthwhile to have a strong guarantee program for MCSMEs that do not
discriminate between export-and domestically-oriented enterprises.
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B. Legislative Agenda
The first item in the agenda is the creation of the body that will champion the cause
of the MCSMEs. It should be pointed out at the outset that there is the need to separate
policy formulation from program implementation. It is this author's view that the NEDA
Board, with the assistance of NEDA as the Secretariat, is well equipped to handle policy
issues related to MCSMEs. What is therefore needed is a body tasked to concretize the
announced policies. In this regard, this study views the creation of a Council as a weak
institution and proposes instead a corporate body for the promotion of MCSMEs. It can
respond more flexibly to the demands of MCSMEs than a Council. It may be called Micro,
Cottage, Small and Medium (MCSM) Business Corporation. The tasks of the proposed
Council mentioned in different bills above can be incorporated here. Implied here is that
existing government institutions performing the same functions as the Corporation are
subsumed under it. Organizationally, the Board of Trustees of the Corporation may be
composed of representatives from the private sector with only one representative from the
government, probably the Finance Secretary. It shall have three departments, with each
being assigned to the following individual programs: training and information system
programs; research and development; and MCSME financing program. The last will be
funded by integrating the existing lendingprograms for MCSMEs including the six major
lending programs of TLRC. This lending program shou_ldfunction like a venture capital
entity focusing on the provision of long-term capital to emerging technology-intensive
MCSMEs. The Corporation may set up its own research and training institutes or
incorporate in it existing research and training institutes. It should be attached to the
Department of Science and Technology to emphasize the need to continually upgrade the
technology of MCSMEs.
There is a need to establish a real independent Guarantee Corporation, It is
proposed here that the charter of Philguarantee be amended to reflect a much broader
mandate. Specifically, domestically-oriented industries should be given equal access to the
guarantee facility. Its capital should be increased so that it can service a wider array of
clientele.
The law governing the creation of venture capital corporations should be amended
to develop the venture capital industry funded mainly by the private sector. The law should
be more specific about the investment activities of venture capital corporations. For
instance, venture capital corporation should invest only in equity and in the start-up
operation of small firms wishingto apply and commercialize newly-developed technology.
In return, the corporation will be allowed to issue bonds or borrow from more than 19
creditors. To encourage private investors to invest in venture capital corporations, tax
breaks such as exemption from capital gains tax should be given to them.
Leasing should be exploited as an alternative method of financing MCSMEs. To
stimulate leasing transactions, the application of the VAT should perhaps be reviewed.
There might be an alternative arrangement whereby a lessee is allowed to offset the VAT
paid by the lessor on the equipment against the lessee's VAT liabilities (Lirio 1987).
Additionally, leasing companies my be allow_ to borrow from more than 19 creditors so
that they can raise more financial resources.
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Finally, there should be a law governing subcontracting to protect subcontractors
from any unfair practices that may be perpetuated by the parent firm. The proposed
MCSM Business Corporation can help in this area by supplying subcontractors with
adequate information about prices of products of interest to subcontractors and other
possible markets.
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J_mm_A.l
PROGI_4MPROF_E
Name of Program : Agro-lndustrial Technology Transfer
Program (AITTP)
Source(s) of Funds : Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
(Japan)
Major Objectives : To strengthen the agricultural
sector by facilitating the transfer
of technology for production and
processing; developing domestic and
export markets; and generating
livelihood opportunities for the
rural sector.
Date/Year Implemented ; 1984
Area(s) of Implementation: Nationwide
Implementing Agencies : Technology and Livelihood
Resource Center (TLRC)
Trustee Bank (if any) : Development Bank of the Philippines
Lending Channels (if any): Direct re-lending of funds by
TLRC-AITTP
Lending Terms and
Conditions
Loan Purpose : Acquisition of fixed assets
and provision for working capital.
Eligible Borrowers : Producers/processors of agri-or
aqua-based projects
Loan Ceiling : _2i Million
Collateral Require-
ments : Land; land improvements;
buildings; and chattels
Maturity : 5 to 15 years inclusive of
i to 5 years grace period
interest Rate (per annum : 8.'75%
Total Funds ; _54_.917 Million
Program status (As of September 30, i989)
Loans Granted : e442.6 Million
Loans Collected : P 43.7 Million
Loans Outstanding : P398.92 Million
Loans Past Due : P 23.6 Million
Repayment Rate : 64.9%
Past Due Ratio ; 6%
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Annex A.2
PROGRAM PROFILE
Name o_ Program : Quedan Financing for Food and
Agricultural Marketing
Enterprises
Source(s) of Funds : National Government/Fund Earnings
Major Objectives : To provide credit support to small
and medium _ood and agricultural
marketing enterprises and thereby
encourage production of basic
commodities; To support the
livelihood program of government
and uplift the income level of
small and medium food and
agricultural business enterprises;
To likewise, involve the banking
sector in providing more assistance
to food and agriculture business
undertakings; and To enhance
J
further the price stabilization
program of the government.
Date/Year Implemented : March 1985
Area(s) of Implementation: Nationwide
Implementing Agencies : Ouedan Guaranteed Fund Board
Trustee Bank (if any)
Lending Channels (if any): Accredited commercial banks,
universal banks, thrift, savings
and loan banks, specialized
government banks, private
development banks, rural banks and
branches of foreign banks.
Lending Terms and
Conditions
Loan Purpose : Projects eligible for financing
shall be small and medium scale
food and agricultural marketing
enterprises which are already in
actual operations but would
otherwise, need additional funding.
Preference however, shall be giyen
to home-scale type of enterprises.
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Eligible Borrowers : Home-scale type proprietors are
•.priority borrowers (business must
be existing)
_Loan Ceiling : Working Capital -P50,000.00
Fixed Assets - P100,000.00
Collateral Require-
ments : Deed of Chattel Mortgage;
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage;
Deed of Assignment
Maturity : 6 months - 3 years
Interest Rate
(per annum(•) : - 12% per annum for weekly
amortization
- .14% .per annum for monthly
amortization
- 16% per annum for quarterly
amortization
Total Funds
Program Status (As oT September 30, 1989)
Loans Granted : _ 13.72 Million
Loans Collected : _ 10.66 Million
,Loans,Outstanding : _ 3.06 Million
Loans Past Due : P i.ii Million
,..-.
Repayment Rate, : 9i %
Past Due Ratio : 36%
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Am,_x A.3
PROGRAM PROI_'R
Name of Program : Quedan Financing for Food Market
Retailers
Source(s) of Fdnds : On a 50/50 fund sharing between
QGFB and accredited lending banks
Major ObJectives : To stabilize retail prices of basic
food commodities by facilitating
credit support to food retailers;
To develop a strong and ready
market for farmers produce
specially those of Sariling Sikap
and/or KKK projects; and To involve
the banking sector in providing
more assistance to food-related
business undertakings.
Date/Year Implemented : April 169 1984 (Cir. No. _17)
Area(s) of Implementation: Nationwide
Implementing Agencies : guedan Guarantee Fund Board
Trustee Bank (if any)
Lending Channels (if any): Accredited commercial banks,
universal banks, thrift, savings
and loan banks, specialized
government banks, private
development banks, rural banks and
branches of foreign banks.
Lending Terms and
Conditions
Loan Purpose : The loan shall be used to- augment
the working capital of food
retailers.
Eligible Borrowers : Must be a bonafide stallholder in a
public market or a bonafide stall
lessee in a private market; must
possess a current mayor's permit
and/or municipal license; must be a
food retailer duly registered
and/or licensed with NFA if engaged
"in grains; fish, meat and poultry
products; and must have a deposit
account with the participating
lending banks where he intends to
borrow.
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Loan Ceiling : For a collateralized loanj loanable
amound depends on loan values and
collateral.
For non-co!lateralized loan, first
availment usually less than P5,000;
loanable amount is up to P10,00_ on
3rd availment; then on fourth
availment, loan ceiling is up to
P20,000.
Collateral Require"
ments : Deed of Assignment of stocks-in-
trade with Trust Receipt Agreement;
Jointly and solidarily liable co-
makers; Deed of Pledge;
Chattel/Real Estate Mortgage; and
other collaterals acceptable to the
banks.
Maturity : 30 days to 360 days depending on
the borrower's amortization
schedule
Interest Rate
(per annum) : - 10% per annum for daily
amortization
- 12% per annum for weekly
amortization
- 14% per annum for monthly
amortization
- 16% per annum quarterly
amortization
Total Funds
Program Status (As of September 30_ 1989)
Loans Granted : P343.34 Million
Loans Collected : P292.b9 Million
Loans Outstanding : P 50.65 Million
Loans Past Due : P 18.14 Million
Repayment Rate ; 94%
Past Due Ratio : 36%
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A_, A.4
PROGRAM PROI_-_-
Name of Program : Quedan Financing for Grains
Businessmen
Source(s) of Funds : National Government/Fund Earnings
Major Objectives : _o augment the operating capital of
food businessmen and encourage
their active participation in the
local procurement of milled rice,
corngrains, sorghum, soybeans,
mongo, peanuts and basic food
commodities; To increase the
direct involvement of private
commercial banks in agricultural
credit in compliance with PD 717;
To strengthen further the integrity
and acceptability of the_Quedan as
collateral for loan availment; To
enhance further the price
stabilization program of the
government; and To support the food
production programs of the
government.
Date/Year Implemented : May 24y 1978
Area(s) of Implementation: Nationwide
Implementing Agencies : Quedan Guarantee Fund Board
Trustee Bank (if any) : None
Lending Channels (if any): Accredited banks directly lending
to trader--millers
Lending Terms and
Conditions
Loan Purpose : For procuring farmer's produce
Eligible Borrowers : Franchised bonded warehousemen'
Loan Ceiling : Maximum loanable amount is based on
loan value of warehousemen's
approved capacity.
Collateral Reqoire _......
merits : Palay, corn, peanut and milled
rice
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Maturity : 3 months - for corn and
milled rice
6 months - for palay and
peanuts
Interest Rate
(per annum} : Prevailing bank interest
rates
Total Funds
Program Status (As of September 30, 1989)
Loans Granted : P6,743.26 Million
Loans Collected : P6,27@.84 Million
Loans Outstanding : P 472.4i Million
Loans Past Due : e 89.19 Million
Repayment Rate : 94 %
Past Due Ratio : 36 %
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PEOGIb_tfFROI_I_
Name of Program : Integrated Rural Financing (IRF)
Program
Source(s) of Funds : Department of Agriculture -
Comprehensive Agricultural Loan
Fund
Major Objectives : To provide comprehensive financing
using the area-specific development
approach to enhance the production
income, and repayment capacity of
the small farmer-clientele; To
support the thrust towards multiple
and diversified farming systems,
and integrated farm financing to
spread risks in lending; To
encourage development of other
v_able small home or rural
industries which are linked to the
main livelihood of the
community/farm household| To
_implify and systematize the
loaning process for banks and
borrower's which may reduce
borrowing and lending costs; and To
ensure repayment to fund sources
and continued credit access to fund
Date/Year Implemented : July 1983
Area(s) of Implementation: Nationwide
Implementing Agencies : Land Bank of the Philippines
Trustee Bank (if any)
Lending Channels (if any): Rural banks, thrift banks and
commercial banks
Lending Terms and
Conditions
Loan Purpose : To finance crop productivity,
poultry, fishing and livestock,
Quedan financing and commodity
Ioans_ and to finance production
and manufacturing activities
Eligible Borrowers : Farmer Groups/Cooperatives
Loan Ceiling
Collateral Require-
ments : Real estate mortgage, co-make_
chattel
Maturity
Interest Rate (per annum): Prevailing market rate
Total Funds : P330.825 Million
Program Status (As of September 309 1989)
Loans Granted : P_2b.02 Million
Loans Collected : P100.48 Million
Loans Outstanding : P223.54 Million
Loans Past Due : P 4.23 Million
Repayment Rate : 9b %
Past Due Ratio : 2 %
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FROG l qROF .
Name of Program : Export Industry Modernization
Project II
Source(s) of Funds : Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund
(OECF)
Major Objectives " To develop non-traditional export-
oriented small and medium scale
firms of the Philippines through
relending loans to or making equity
investments in their modernization
,projects.
Date/Year Implemented ,: January, 1988
Area(s) of Implementation: Nationwide
Implementing Agencies : Technology and Livelihood Resource
. Center (TLRC)
Trustee Bank (if any) :
Lending Channels (if any): Direct re-lending of funds by TLRC
Lending Terms and
Conditions
Loan Purpose : Building, machinery, working
capital
Eligible Borrowers : New or existing small and medium
enterprises
Loan Ceiling : P5 Million
CollateralRequire-
ments : 180% coverage with hard assets from
the projects, such as land,
building machines
Maturity
Interest Rate (per annum): 10%
Total Funds : 60 Billion (Yen)
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_oG_ PRo_
Name of Program : Industrial Guarantee and Loan Fund
(IGLF) Program
Source(s) of Funds : World Bank
Major Objectives : To encourage and promote the
setting up and expansion of
cottage, small and medium-scale
industries.
Date/Year Implemented
Area(s) oT Implementation:
implementing Agencies : Department of Loans and Credit -
Central Bank
Trustee Bank (if any)" :
Lending Channels (if any)_: Commercial Banks, Thrift Banks,
Rural Banks
Lending Terms and
Conditions
Loan Purpose : Purchase of factory site for new
and expansion of projects; maximum
of 25% of amount applied for;
construction of factory buildings;
p u r E h a S e o
machinery/equipment/fixtures and
installation costs; and permanemt
working capital.
Eligible Berrov_ers : Manufacturing concerns and these
ser'vi_e industries supportive of
manufacturing activities like
.. warehousing, repair shops,etc.
Loan Ceiling _ Accredited Scheme - Maximum
Cottage e0.4 Million;
....Small e4.0 Million;
- Medium _i6.0 Million
Non-Accredited Scheme -Maximum
.. - Cottage P15_,_0;
- Small P150,00_;
--Medium P.150_00_
Collateral Require-"
ments : Working capita] - maximum of 7
years inclusive uf 2 years grace
period.
Fixed assets - maximum of 12 q
years inclusive of 3 years grace
period.
Maturity : Prevailing market rate.
Total Fun0s
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Annex A.8
PROGRAM PROFILE
Name of Program : Tulong sa Tao Program
Source(s) oT Funds : National Government
Major Objectives : To assist micro-business
entrepreneurs, including government
retirees (civil and military), and
ex-detainees who intend to expand
their livelihood projects or
establish new ones; To provide at
least 130 Private Voluntary
Organizations (FVOs) with revolving
funds for lending to micro-business
or livelihood projects;, and To
develop the capabilities of PVOs in
managing a lending program.
Date/Year Implemented : 1987
Area(s) of Implementation: Nationwide
Implementing Agencies : Department of Trade and Industry -
Bureau of Small and Medium Business
Development (DTI-BSMBD)
Trustee Bank (if any)
Lending Channels (if any): Private Voluntary Organizations
(PVOs)
Lending Terms and
Conditions
Loan Purpose
Eligible Borrowers : The ultimate beneficiaries of the
program will be qualified
individuals with entrepreneurial
skills potentials. Specifically
these are: micro- entrepreneurs,
including government retirees
(civil and military) and political
ex-detainees.
Loan Ceiling : The maximum amount of loan to a
qualified PVO should not exceed
_1,000,0_@.0_. PVO loan
beneficiaries shall be up to a
maximum of _25,0_0.00
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Collateral Require-
ments
Maturity : The term of repayment will be one
year (principal and interest). The
first quarter release will fall due
after one year. The loan will be
subject to yearly renewal.
Interest Rate (per annum) : The DTI shall charge the PVOs
interest of 7% p.a.
The PVO shall charge the
beneficiaries the prevailing
commercial rate.
Total Funds _ : _bO Million
Total Amount Loaned to PVO,
eM (as of December 1988) : P31.8 Million
No. of PVOs : iii
End/Direct Loan
Beneficiaries : 7,401
No. of Jobs Generated : Ii,734
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PROGRAM PROFILE
Name of Program : Bagong Kilusang Kabuhayan at
Kaunlaran -Expanded Conduited
Guaranty and Lending Programs:
Kabuhayan sa Nayon
Source(s) of Funds : National Livelihood Support Fund
(National Government)
Major Objectives : To promote livelihood through the
establishment of labor-intensive
projects and small and micro-scale
enterprises; To promote good
citizenry by instilling respect for
government laws and regulations,
social consciousness and the sense
of credit responsibility; To
provide short and medium term
credits to project proponents for
the financing kof their livelihood
projects; and To establish an
appropriate institutional and
policy framework that will promote
productive employment for the
citizenry at the barangay level.
Date/Year Implemented : 1986
Area(s) of Implementation: Nationwide
Implementing Agencies : Technology and Livelihood
Resource Center (TLRC)
Trustee Bank (if any) : Land Bank of the Philippines
Lending Channels (if any): Participating Financial
Institutions (PFIs)
Lending Terms and
Conditions
Loan Purpose : Anchor-Chain Type; Stand Alone
Type
Eligible Borrowers : Preferable new or existing clients
of TLRC; Filipino or 6@% or more
Filipino-owned corporation; credit-
worthy; do not have any outstanding
loan in arrears in any BKKK lending
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program. An individual or private
entity (whether sole
proprietorship, partnership,
corporation, cooperative or other
organizations) having the legal
capacity to borrow and enter into a
contract.
Loan Ceiling : PI Million for Anchor Chain; P2_8
thousand for Stand Alone type
Collateral Require-
ments : Unencumbered project and personal
assets such as livestock
inventories, standing crops, raw
materials and finished goods.
Maturity : i - to 5 years
Interest Rate (per annum): 16% (beneficiaries)
Total Funds : P10_,000 Million
Program Status (As of September 30, 1989)
Loans Granted : _28.10 Million
Loans Collected : P 9.51 Million
Loans Outstanding : P 18.59 Million
Loans Past Due : P 6.15 Million
Repayment Rate : 61%
Past Due Ratio : 33%
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PROGRAM PROF_ _
Name of Program : The Small _nd Medium Industry Loan
Program: A Land Bank-SSS
Partnership (_MILP)
Source(s) of Funds : Social Security System (SSS)
Major Objectives : To create financing package to fund
business expansion at fixed
interest rate for long-term loans;
and To provide long-term credit for
the growth of smal i and medium-
scale industries.
Date/Year Implemented : January, I98_
Area(s) of Implementation: Nationwide
Implementing Agencies : Land Bank of the Philippines
Trustee Bank (if any)
Lending Channels (if any): Land Bank of the Philippines
Lending Terms and
Conditions
Loan Purpnse ; Acquisition of project/warehouse
sites, machinery, or equipment.
Cor_truction of factory
building/warehouses, and other
ci,,.i] works.
Eligible Borrowers : Sole proprietorships, partnerships,
and/or corporations with an
acceptable track, record, assets
and/or sales of at least NO
Million, which are involved in the
following activities:
_Agri-business
_Manufacturing
_Utilities
_Transportation and
Communication
_Commercial production
particularly
of _ood and basic
consumer items
_Export related businesses
Loan Ceiling : P2@.e Million per project
Collateral Require-
ments
Maturity
Interest Rate
(per annum) : Prevailing market
rate (beneficiaries)
Total Funds : P5@@ Million
NO. of Projects Approved : 27
Total Value of Projects
Approved : P196 Million
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Annex A.11
PROGRAM PROFILE
Name of Program : Special-Agriculture, Small and
Medium Industries Lending (A-SMILE)
Source(s) of Funds : Social Security System (SSS)
Major Objectives : To provide financial assistance to
socially responsible entrepreneurs
as start-up capital or for the
expansion of industrial, agro-
industrial, and manufacturing
concerns and service industries
supportive of manufacturing
activities.
Date/Year Implemented : July 1986
Area(s) of Implementation: Nationwide
Implementing Agencies : Development Bank of the Philippine s
Trustee Bank (if any)
Lending Channels(if any) : DBP Branches and Field Offices
Lending Terms and
Conditions
Loan Purpose : Acquisition of fixed assets and for
working capital requirements of
projects.
Eligible Borrowers : Entrepreneurs engaged in projects
such as agriculture, manufacturing,
trading and other undertakings.
Loan Ceiling
Collateral Require-
ments : Any or a combination of- the
following may be accepted:
a. First mortgage on real estate
b. Chattel mortgage on movable
properties
c,. Assignment of letters of
credit or confirmed purchase
orders, or sales contracts
Maturity : Prevailing market rate
(beneficiaries)
Total Funds : _150 Million
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PROGRAM PROFILE
Name of Program : National Livelihood Support Fund-
Livelihood Development Project
Source(s) of Funds : Consolidated Funds of the KKK
Major Objectives : Deliver livelihood program packages
that would address the needs of the
beneficiaries of priority areas
that will transform them into
bankable/self-reliant entities; To
establish a functional network of
cooperating SDOs serving the poor;
and To mobilize and empower
community groups and poverty
organizations and to undertake
activities that will enbale them to
access the basic services needed to
uplift their living conditions.
Date/Year Implemented : 1988
Area(s) of Implementation: Nationwide with priority on
depressed areas
Implementing Agencies _ National Livelihood Support Fund/
Office of the Rresident
Trustee Bank (if any) _ band Bank of the Philippines
Lending Channels (if any): Non-government organizations
Lending Terms and
Conditions
Loan Purpose : Livelihood/Income-Generating
Eligible Borrowers : NGOs
Loan Ceiling z e300,000/project
Maturity : Based on project cash flow but not
to exceed 5 years.
Collateral Require-
ments : none
Interest Rate per annum : 12% (maximum rate to beneficiaries)
Program Status (As of December 31, 1989)
Approved Funding
Commitment : P388,779,@@0
No. of Approved Programs : 47 programs
Funds Released to SDOs : P62,764,450
No. of SDOs used a_ _und
Conduits .: 27 SDOs
No. of Projects f_d_
by Programs : 3,043 projects
No. of Direct
Beneficiaries : 9_729
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Annex B.1
SMALL-SCALE ENTERPRISE MUTUAL RELIEF SYSTEM
A. Backgroundto the establishment of the system.
Small-scale enterprises constitute some 80% of the total number of enterprises in Japan, and
play an important role in the Japanese economy.
However, since most small-scale enterprises have the strong characteristic of "work for
subsistenee,'and have weak economic foundations and low profitability,they are always in an unstable
condition.
Under those circumstances, this system was formed to attempt to improve and promote the
welfare of the small-scale enterprise proprietors in the above-mentioned environments.
B. Setup of the system.
In this system, the small-scale enterprise proprietors make installment payments of premiums
in order to qualifyforbenefits which willbe a security to them upon retirement fromexecutive positions
or discontinuation of the business,when the "mutual relief money"can be received.
This benefit program acts as an important support for more than one million small-scale
enterprise proprietors enrolled in the system to date.
C. Outline of the system.
1. Qualification for entry.
SmaU-scale enterprise proprietors and their executives.
2. Installment payments of premium.
Monthly installment payments of premium can be optionally selected from the range of a
minimum Y1,000to a maximum of Y50,000provided that the amount is a multiple of Y500.
3. Grounds for payment of the mutual relief money.
A mutual relief allowance of a specified amount is granted to those who have made monthly
installment payments of premiums formore than 6 months and those who fallunder any of the
following categories:
a. Termination of private concerns (inclusive of death of owner).
b. Resignation of executives due to dissolution of the company.
c. Persons over65 yearsof age who have made monthly installment payments of premiums
for more than 15 years. (The mutual relief money will be paid upon request even if
the grounds mentioned in a -c have not occurred).
4. There are two loan systems for subscribers of the mutual relief system as follows:
a. A subscriber may immediately receive a loan forbusiness funds appropriate to the total
amount of his/her premium installments.
b. A subscriber may receive a loan from the mutual relief fund in ease of illness, injury
or accident.
Source:AnnualReportof theJapanSmallBusinessCorporation(1989).
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Annex B.2
SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISE MUTUAL RELIEF FOR
PREVENTING CHAIN-REACTION BANKRUFTCIES
A, The Background to the e,._ablislunent of the system.
Since the economic foundation of a small and medium enterprise is weak, they are often
susceptible to the impact of the bankruptcy of their clients and consequently, there are many cases of
chain-reaction bankruptcies.
This system was established to prevent the chain-reaction bankruptcy of small and medium
enterprises as a result of the damage received by unexpected bankruptcy of their clients.
B. Setup of the system.
Under this system, small and medium enterprises make installment payment of premiums into
the fund and when the fear of a chain-reaction bankruptcy breaks out due to the difficulty in collection
of receivable bills or dishonored receivable drafts by the bankruptcy of a client, they may receive mutual
relief loans equal to their damage up to ten times their total amount of instaUment premium payments.
C. Outline of the system.
1. Qualification entry
Small and medium enterprises in existence for longer than one year, or a cooperative
association organized by small and medium enterprises.
2. Installment payments of premiums.
Monthly installment premium payments can be optionally selected from a range of a
minimum YS,000to maximum of Y80,000provided that the amount is a multiple of ¥5,000.
Premium payment can be made up to a total amount of Y3.2 million.
3. Amount of loan of mutual relief money.
Subscribers who are unable to recover accounts and bills receivable due to bankruptcy
of a client may receive a mutual relief loan, whose amount is equivalent to either ten times the
amount of the installment payments of premium so far accumulated or the amount of total
damages, whichever is lower.
The maximum amount of loan is up to Y32 million and is extended without security,
guarantor, or interest. This loan is made available beginning 6 months following subscription.
The repayment period is 5 years (inclusive of a 6 months period of deferment).
4. Tempor_'y loan.
A temporary loan up to the limits of the total amount of installment premium payment
can be received when subscribers face an emergency situation or need temporary business funds.
_)urce: AnnualReportof the JapanSmallBusinessCorporation(1989).
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: The Citizens National Bank
Major Function: . Financing the commercialization: . A company _ntent on locally made
: of new technology or new products: machinery/quality improvement
: by small and medium scale firms : Management/technology training
: : for small and medium scale firms
Contents of : . facility fee : . facility fee : . equity invest-: .limit:
Loans : : :ment :
: - loan period: : - loan period: : : no limit in
: within 8 yrs. : within 5 yrs. : - investment : financing
: (including a : : within 50% of : amount, within
: grace period) : -%: within 100% : the paid-ln : 80% of the
: : of the necessary: capital : necessary
: - percentage: : financing : : financing (70%
: within 70% of : : - debenture : for technology
: the necessary : - limit: hone : acquisition : development,
: financing : : : quality
: : : - loan : improvement,
: - limit: 250 : : financing if : 100% for
: million won : : additional : facilities for
: : : necessary : energy saving)
: : : financing needed:
: . operation fee: . operation fee : . investment : . method and
: : : limit : period:
: - period: with : - period: : : lendlng by a
: 5 yrs. : within 1 yr. • - within 300 : certificate
: : (lending by a : mil. won per a :
: - percentage: : note) : company, : within 10 yrs.
: within 100% of : : (combination of : (technology
: the necessary : within 3 yrs. : equity and : development,
: financing : (mututal : debenture} : quality
: : benefit) : : improvement
: - limit: i00 : : :
: mil. won : - % : with 100% : : - within 8 yrs.
: : of the necessary: :
: : financing : :
: : - limit: none : :
collateral : real estate, : : equity : real estate
: provisional : : investment: : provision
: certificate : . : without : certificates
: : : collateral : fidelity
: fidelity : :,debenture : guarantees
: guarantees : : acquisition :
: : : wlth collateral :
Source: Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology,
A Study of the Effect of KTDC's Financing Activities (1986).
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Annex C.3
FINANCING FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZED BUSINESSES
Financing Scale : : No Limit
Candidates : : minor entrepreneurs
: : .R & D for new products, new manufacturing
: : process or product improvement
: : .commercialization manufacturing of new
: : development of technology or imported
: : technology
Z
: : .purchasing of R & D facilities & equipment
: : .import of technology & improvement of
: imported technology
terms of lending : banks : ail the financial institutions (excluding
: : the Industrial, Bank Import/Export Bank and
: : the Long-Term Credit Bank, and branch
: _ offices of foreign banks)
: period : within 5 yrs. (including a grace period of
: : 2 yrs.)
:interest : annual interest rate of i0.0 - 11.5% (i0.0 -
:rate z 13.5% for 'facility funds for more than 1
: z year')
: should be examined or recommended for the
others : technological validity by the government
: research institute
Source: Korea Advancedlnstitute of Science and Technology,
A Study of the Effect of KTDC's Financing Activities (1986).
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Annex C.4
THE MACHINE INDUSTRY ADVANCEMENT FUND
Financing Scale : 8.4 Bil. Won ('85)
Candidates : As a small and medium sized machine industry
: registered in accordance with article 6 of
: the machine Industry Advancement Act,
: it should comply with one of the following
: conditions:
: a company be recommended as a promissing
: small and medium sized business
: a company awarded for developing high quality
: machinery
: . a prize winner in the precision contest
: a joint-venture in accordance with the
: Article 6 of the Small & Medium Sized
: Business Systematization Promotion Art
: * Sectors with priority
: . development cost for the items requested by
: the Demand & Supply Corp. Association and
: exhibited in the components Exhibition
: organized by the Korea Machinery Industry
: Promotion Association
: . development cost for the items (including
.... : parts) with highprospects for export and with
: manufacturing request from overseas
: . development cost for the items (including
: parts) considered by the Minister of Commerce
: and Industry to be essential for import
: substitution, increase of exports and
: technology development.
banks : The Small & Medium Industry Bank
: % : . will provide up to 90% of the necessary
: : financing
:limit : 200 mil. won
terms :period : . within 5 yr s . (including a grace period of 2 yrs.)
:interest : annual interest rate of 6.0
:rate
:method : . lending by certificate
Others : . lending request: the Korea Machine Industry
: Advancement Association
Source: Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology,
A Study of the Effect of KTDC's Financing Activities (1986).
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Annex c.5
THE ELECTRONIC INDUSTRY ADVANCEMENT FUND
Scale : 4 Bil 227 Mil. ('85)
Candidates : Small and medium scale companies
: selected by the Electronic Industry
: Advancement Funds through the
: consideration of the operation 4
management committee of the Funds
banks : The Small & Medium Industry Bank
:financing : 'limit set by the Electronic Industry
t :amount : Advancement Funds
e
r :period : within 5 years (repayment of 3 years"
m : : equally divided installment with a
s : : grace period of 2 years
:interest rate : annual 6.0 %
Others : lending request: the Korea Society for
: the Advancement of Machine Industry
Source: Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology,
A Study of the Effect of KTDC's Financing Activities (1986).
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Annex C.6
THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY MODERNIZATION FUND
Scale : 3 Bil ('85)
Candidates : one who intends to run a fibre
: industry in accordance with the
: Fibre Industry Modernization Act
banks : The Cho-Heung Bank Ltd,
: The Commercial Bank of Korea Ltd.
: Korea First Bank
: Korea Exchange Bank
: The Small & Medium Industry Bank
: percent : within 90% of the purchasing
: : cost of machinery
t : limit : 300 mil won
e _,
r : period : repayment of equally divided
m : : installment within 5 years with a
s : : grace period of 3 years
: interest : annual 6.0 %
: rate
Others : lending request: the Korea Fiber
: Industry Association
Sourcez Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology,
A Study of the Effect of KTDC's Financing Activities (1986).
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Annex C,7
THE SMALL & MEDIUM SIZED BUSINESS ADVANCEMENT FUND
Scale : 55 Ell 500 Mil ('85) (won)
: modernization: 22.4 bil
z . cooperation: 21.4 bil
: . traditional arts and crafts: 1.1 bll
: . company formation: 3 bil
: industries in farming and
: fishing area: 7.8 bil
Candidates : . modernization
: the modernization project must be
: approved by the representative
: of the Small & Medium sized Business
: Advancement Corp. (SMSA)
: . business conversion
: the business conversion project must
z be approved by the SMBA
: . company formation
: the company formation project must
: be approved by the SMBA
: cooperation
: the cooperation must be approved
: by SMEA
: recommended companies
: one recommended by SMBA for their
z financing needs according to the
: training results by the Small &
: Medium Sized Business Advancement
: Corp.
: . local small & medium sized businesses
z
: one recognized by the representative
: of the Small & Medium Sized Business
: Advancement Corp.
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Scale : 55 Bil 500 MiZ ('85) (won)
: . traditional arts and crafts Industry
: selected from the candidates for
: traditional arts and crafts
: industrial promotion designated to
: produce traditional arts and crafts
: or a prize winner in traditional
: arts and crafts contest
: . one approved of the project for
: developing rural income sources
banks : The Small & Medium Industry Bank
: The Citizens National Bank
financing purpose : facility fund operation fund
: . modernization facilities for operation fund
: modernization for approved
: projects modernization
: projects,
: . business business conver- conversion
: conversion sion projects projects, and
: company formation
: comapny company formation process
: formation process (including
: facility
: investment
: overseas
: purchasing cOSt
: . cooperation - financing for - the necessary
: the purchasing financing
: of the site or for cooperation
: building projects
: - construction
: fund of the
: site
: - construction - machine install-
: fund/flnancing ation/antipollutlon
: for the backup equipments/other
: facilities common facilities/
: such as including common
: electricity/ sector, a separated
: others plant site
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Scale : 55 Bil 500 Mil ('85) (won)
: recommended the financing the necessary
: companies the purchase of operation fund
: facilities approved by the
: approved by a SMSA
: representative
: of the Small &
: Medium Sized
: Business
: Advancement Corp.
: the tradi- . the purchasing the necessary
: tional arts of facilities operation fund
: and crafts for the develop- for the development
: industry ment & production and production
: of the traditional
: arts and crafts
: industries - construction the necessary
: in farming & fund and operation fund
: fishing additional for the development
: villages facility of income sources
: financing in rural areas
: - the purchasing
: of machinery
: - other common
: facility
: percent : Purpose by sector
1 : : . moderni- . within 300 mil. within i00 mil.
: : zation (within 90% of (with 50% of
e _ : business the necessary the necessary
: : . conversion facility fund) operation fund
n : : company at a time)
: : formation
d : : recommended
: : . local small
i : : & medium
: : sized firms
n :
: : . cooperation within 70% of within 50% of
g : : projects the necessary the necessary
: : facility fund operation fund
: : (within 90% of at a time
: : the common
: : antipollution
: : facility fund)
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Scale : 55 Bil 500 Mil ('85) (won)
t _ : . traditional within 50 mil. . within 50 mil.
: : arts and (with 90% of (within 90% of
e = : crafts the necessary the necessary
= : facility fund) operation fund
r : : at a time)
m : : . industries within 300 mil. within 100 mil.
: : infarming & (with 70% of (within 70% of
s : : fishing the necessary the necessary
= : villages facility fund) operation fund
: : at a time)
: period : facility financing: within 8 yrs.
= : (including a grace
: : period of 3 yrs.)
:
: : . operation financing: within 3 yrs.
: : (including a grace
: : period of 1 yr.)
: interest : facility financing: annual 9% (5% for
: rate : joint purchasing of
: : antipollution facility)
: : . operation financing: annual 9%
: repayment repayment of equally-divided-semi-aanual-
: method installment after the grace period
: limit : 400 mil (300 mil in facility financing,
: : i00 mil in operation financing), no limit
: : for financing for the site, building/
: : common facility
Others : . selection of candldates/decislon of the
: lending amount: the Small & Medium sized
: Business Advancement Corp.
: . the period of application for the loan/
: within 90 days after the notice for lending
Source: Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology,
A Study of the Effect of KTDC's Financing Activities (1986).
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Annex C.8
THE TRUST GUARANTEE FUND
: mining industry • manufacturing . electricity
eligible : and gas
industries :
: . construction . wholesale . transportation
: and safety deposit
: . technology services
: . architecture and design . surveying
: . the medical and public health industry
: . repair industry, overseas resources
:. development
types of : loan guarantee . the second financial guarantee
trust
guarantee : provision guarantee . tax-payment guarantee
Z
: debenture guarantee
: bill guarantee . facility-lendlng guarantee
: . undertaking guarantee
by type : operation fund: within 300% of one's
of funds : own capital, within the operation cost at
: a time x average score of the achievement test
: 70
: only, set the operation financing at 1/3 of
: annual sales amount or at the sales
: amount during the last 4 months regardless
: of the business classification, in case of the
: following:
: (1} export financing
: (2) guarantee for companies approved for joint
: business projects for small and medium
; sized business systemization in accordance
: with the Small & Medium sized Business
: Systematization Act
: (3) the demand & supply of small & medium
: sizedbusiness trust-guaranted by the
: mother company of the systemized company
I04
: * the operation fund by type of business
: (i) Mining, Manufacturing, Electric, Gas, Rail
: Industry: 1/4 of the annual sales amount,
: or the sales amount during the last 3
: months
: (2) Construction, wholesale & retail trade,
: transportation, safety deposit, travel
: agency, the medical & public health,
: technology service industry: 1/6 of the
: annual sales amount, or the sales amount
: for the last 2 months
: (3) Others: 1/12 of the annual sales amount
: or the sales amount for the last month
: facility fund: within (one's own capital
: + fixed debts + loan requested - fixed
: asset)
: only, in case that a guaranteed facility
: is obtained as a collateral immediately
: after its completion and appropriated for
: the guarantee termination, the requested
: amount is set at the assessed amount
: within the necessary cost
guarantee : 1 bil. won
limit
commission : annual 1.0% (1.5% for large companies)
: only, repayment in installments is allowed
: in case the guarantee exceeds 1 bil. won
procedure : requesting companies - counselling - registration
: credit investigation - examination - decision -
: notice - contract - certificate issuing - execution
required : an application (with certain format)
papers
: . basic reference to the business achievements
: . a written confirmation of the financial
: transactions
: a copy of the business registration card
: or financial records (of the last 3 quarters)
: a registered copy of the residential address
: of the representative
: the articles of a company, a registered
: copy of a corporation, a list of
: shareholders (applied only to a
: corporation)
: others
the small : "provisional evaluation standard" is
sum- : applied in case of a small & medium sized
guarantee : business trust guarantee worth no more
system : than 50 mil.
commissioned: a small sum of guarantee worth no more
guarantee : than 50 mil is dealt in the pertinent
: banks
guarantee : no less than 40% of the total guarantee
ratio for :
small & : * Since 1984, new guarantees are continued
medium : to small & medium sized businesses in
sized : observance of the operation plan of the
business : Trust Guarantee Funds
Source: Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology,
A Study of the Eff_ict of KTDC's Financing Activities (1986).
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